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II/67/87-EN  This  paper only exists in English ABSTRACT 
This  paper  presents  the  results  of  a  study  of  the  causes  of  change  in 
the  real  rate  of  interest  in  the  OECD  area  during  the  period  1961  to 
1984  with  a  particular attention given  to  the  impact  on  the  real  rate 
of interest of  the  increase in the  aggregate  government  budget  deficit 
for  the  OECD  area  as  a  whole  since  the  late  1970s.  Using  both  time 
series  analysis  and  cross-section  data  the  paper  concludes  that  the 
global  rise in real interest rates  can  be attributed to a  large extent 
to  the  increase  in  the  real  government  borrowing  (as  appropriately 
adjusted  to  measure  the  effect  on  the  private  sector's  holding  of 
public  debt  in proportion  to  GDP).  The  study,  however,  also  shows  that 
the  development  of  real interest rates in the  individual countries may 
diverge  substantially  from  the  global  pattern and  that,  consequently, 
the  link between real interest rates  and  fiscal deficits may  not  be  as 
evident  for  a  single  OECD  country  as  for  the  area  as  a  whole.  This 
paper  argues  that  since  the  gains  from  budgetary consolidation may  not 
be  evident  for  a  single  country  there has  been  and still is a  tendency 
to  underestimate  the  risks  for  the  OECD  area  as  a  whole  of  a 
persistently  strong  increase  of  public  debt  in  proportion  to  GDP  and 
to  overestimate  the  deflationary  impact  for  the  world  economy  of  a 
reduction of  the  federal  budget  deficit in the  United States. CONTENTS 
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1.  Introduction 
Although interest rates have  fallen world-wide  since  the  peak  in  1981, 
they  are  still  significantly  higher  than  on  average  for  the  1960s, 
notably  when  adjusted  for  the  current  or  prospective  rate  of 
inflation.  What  are  the  causes  for  the  rise  in rates  in  the  period  up 
to  1981?  Can  a  consistent  explanation  be  given  for  the  persistence of 
high  real  rates  in  recent  years?  What  is  the  role  of  fiscal  and 
monetary  policy in the determination of  interest rates? 
These  questions  have  been  raised  and  contradictory  answers  have  been 
given  in  the  economic  literature  in  the  last  few  years.  While,  on  one 
hand,  there  has  been  a  certain  degree  of  consensus  that  the  emerging 
budget  deficit  in  the  United  States  has  been  one  of  the  causes  of  the 
increase  in  real  rates  of  interest,  the  hypothesis  that  the  global 
increase  in  rates  was  caused  by  expansionary  fiscal  policy  was, 
nevertheless,  discarded  by  Blanchard  and  Summers  (1984).  The  two 
authors,  in  fact,  argued  that  there  had  been  at  most  a  negligible 
fiscal  expansion  worldwide,  the  rise  in  the  US  budget  deficit  having 
been  compensated  by  a  fiscal  contraction  in Europe  and  Japan.  Charles 
Wyplosz  ( 1984),  on  the  other  hand,  found  that  the  change  in  public 
debt  in proportion to  GDP  exerts a  strong effect on  the  long-term rate 
of  interest,  as  indicated  by  a  high  coefficient  in  aggregate 
regression equations  for  the major  OECD  countries as  a  whole. 
This  paper  presents  the  'results  of  an  attempt  to  answer  these 
questions  using  the  portfolio  approach  as  suggested  by  Brunner  and 
Meltzer  (1976)  and  basing,  like  Wyplosz,  the  quantitative  analysis 
upon  aggregate  data  for  a  group  of  countries  representative  for  the 
whole  of  OECD.  Section 2  first provides  a  brief review of  the attempts 
to  explain  the  level  and  development  of  interest  rates.  A  conceptual 
framework  for  an  analysis  of  interest  rate  movements  in  a  closed 
economy  is  presented  in  section  3  and  section  4  provides  a  review  of 
the  statistical  data.  The  econometrica!  findings  using  this 
conceptual  framework  are  presented  in  section  5.  Section  6  takes  a -5-
look  at  recent  developments  and  section  7  contains  a  summary  of  the 
paper  and  some  broad conclusions. 
2.  Modelling  interest rates 
While  the  bulk  of  interest  rate  theory  in  the  classical  economic 
literature  focussed  on  the  real  rate  of  interest,  Fisher  (1930) 
stressed  than  the  nominal  rate  of  return  on  monetary  assets  includes 
an  element  which  compensates  the  lender  for  the  rate  on  inflation 
expected  to  occur  over  the  lifetime  of  the  asset.  Subsequently 
interest  rate  research  has  tended  to  split  into  two  streams,  one 
concentrating  on  the  inflation  component  and  the  determination  of 
nominal  rates  and  the  other  on  the  determination  of  the  real  rate  of 
interest. 
2.1  Inflation component  and  nominal rates 
Given  that,  according  to  the  Fisher  approach,  the  inflation  component 
of  the  interest  rate  is  determined  by  anticipated  rather  than  actual 
inflation,  a  large  amount  of  research  has  gone  into  analyzing  the 
formation  of  inflation  expectations  and  their  effect  on  interest 
rates.  An  example  of  such  research  is  found  in  Tanzi  (1980)  which 
presents,  notably,  various  least  square  regressions  to  explain  the 
formation  of  inflation  expectations  and  then  uses  these  results  to 
explain  movements  in  nominal  interest  rates.  His  model  for  inflation 
expectations,  however,  only  included  survey  data  and  actual  price 
developments  and,  thus,  did  not  approach  the  important  issue  of  the 
effect  on  interest  rates  and  inflation  expectations  of  monetary  and 
budgetary  policy  or  other  "exogeneous"  factors  as  examined,  i.a.  in 
the  study  by  Wyplosz  referred  to  in  the  Introduction.  It  is 
noteworthy,  however,  that  as  soon  as  the  simple  Fisher  equation  is 
abandoned  in favour  of  a  broader approach,  the distinction between  the 
real  component  and  the  inflation  compensation  becomes  increasingly 
blurred.  Moreover,  some  authors  also  rightly  point  out  that -6-
distortions of  the interest rate determination may  result  from  the  tax 
treatment  of  interest  payments  and  receipts  in  inflationary 
conditions.  These  distortions  are  caused  by  "nominal"  taxation  but 
influence  the  equilibrium  value  of  the  real  interest  rate  - which, 
then,  becomes  dependent  upon  the  rate of  inflation! 
In  an  open  economy,  moreover,  interest  rates  may  interact  with 
exchange  rates  in  a  way  determined  by  the  degree  of  substitutability 
of  domestic  and  foreign  monetary  assets  and  the  flexibility  of  the 
exchange  rate. 
Although  governments  often  with  a  varying  degree  of  success  have 
attempted  to  influence  interest  rates  through  general  monetary  policy 
measures  or  through  control  with  certain  financial  markets,  the 
determination  of  the  interest  rate  level  remains  of  a  highly 
endogenous  nature,  depending  upon  the  operation  of  the  whole  economic 
system.  Consequently,  one  might  expect  that  a  broader  macroeconomic 
model,  including  equations  describing  the  key  demand  and  supply 
relationships,  would  be  likely  to  provide  a  more  satisfactory 
explanation  of  interest  rate  developments  than  single  equation  models 
of  the  Fisher-type.  This  is,  notably,  the  case  for  the  "real" 
component  of  the interest rate. 
2.2 Modelling  the real rate of  interest 
While  the  estimates  of  the  Fisher-equations  generally assume  that  the 
real  rate  of  interest  is  constant  apart  from  possible  cyclical 
fluctuations,  research  aimed  at  analyzing  the  determination  of  the 
real  rate  clearly  must  operate  with  the  hypothesis  of  some  link 
between  the  real  rate  of  interest  on  bonds  and  the  rate  of  return  on 
other  types  of  assets  and  also  of  some  degree  of  interaction  between 
the  rate  of  growth  of  the  economy  and  the  profitability  of 
investment.  Single-equation  models  of  interest  rates  cannot 
appropriately  describe  this  net  of  interactions  and  conceptual 
analysis  of  the  development  of  the  real  rate  of  interest  has, 
therefore,  mainly  been  done  within  the  framework  of  general--7-
equilibrium  models  including  a  supply  side  bloc  in  addition  to  the 
IS-LM  bloc.  An  approach  along  such  lines  will  be  used  in  the 
following. 
3.  A closed-economy  framework 
The  conceptual  framework  presented below does  not  pretend  to  provide  a 
full modelisation  of  the  economy  but  only  to  identify  and  analyze  the 
interaction  of  key  variables  likely  to  influence  the  medium-term 
performance  of  an  economy.  The  study,  thus,  may  serve  as  a  starting 
platform  on  which  to  construct  a  more  comprehensive  macro-economic 
model  or,  at  least,  underpin  arguments  for  extending  or  revising  the 
macro-economic  models  already  in  use  and  which  often  ignore  the 
interaction of  stock and  flow variables analyzed here. 
3.1 The  basic three-asset model 
This  analysis  takes  as  a  starting  point  the  three-asset  steady-state 
growth  model  presented  in  Cukierman  and  Mortensen  (1983  and  1985)  and 
which  specifies  a  system  of  four  equations  determining  the 
capital-output  ratio,  the  ratio  of  public  debt  to  GDP,  the  ratio  of 
high-powered  money  to  GDP  and  the  real  rate  of  interest  as  a  function 
of  the  rate  of  growth  of  high-powered  money,  the  government  budget 
deficit  excluding  interest  payments,  the  marginal  productivity  of 
capital and  the rate  of  growth  of  labour  input  (the  rate  of  growth  of 
the  labour  force  as  uplifted  to  include  the  rate  of  technical 
progress).  It  is  shown  in  Cukierman  and  Mortensen  (see  notably 
appendix  A)  that  an  increase  in  the  government  budget  deficit 
excluding interest payments  on  public debt  under  plausible assumptions 
with  respect  to  the  value  of  the  other  exogenous  variables will  lead 
to a  rise in the real rate of  interest. 
The  formal  structure  of  the  model  as  presented  in  Cukierman  and 
Mortensen is as  follows: -8-
K/Y  = 81(fk(v(K/Y)),r,g-m)  (1) 
B/Y  = g2(fk(v(K/Y)),r,g-m)  (2) 
H/Y  = (1/a)g3(fk(v(K/Y)),r,g-m)  (3) 
D/Y  +  rB/Y  =  g(B/Y +  H/Y)  +  pH/Y.  (4) 
The  variables  are  defined  as  follows  (with  slight  changes  compared  to 
the  terminology used  in the  Cukierman-Mortensen  study): 
K = stock of  real capital 
B  real stock of government  bonds 
H =  real stock of  base money  (high  powered  money) 
D =  real government  deficit,  excluding  interest on  debt 
y  real gross  domestic  product 
r  =  real rate of  interest 
g  = real rate of growth 
m  rate of  increase  in high  powered  money 
a  =  the money  market multiplier 
p  rate of  inflation. 
The  function  v(K/Y)  in  equation  1  to  3  determines  the  real  rate  of 
return  on  fixed  capital which  is  assumed  to  be  equal  to  the  marginal 
productivity  of  capital  and  determined  in  its  turn  by  the 
capital/labour  ratio.  It is, moreover,  assumed  that  the  three  assets 
are gross  substitutes;  an  increase  in the  rate of  return on  asset  j  is 
expected  to  lead  to  a  rise  in  the , demand  for  this  asset  and  to  a 
decline  in  the  demand  for  the  other  two  assets.  The  real  rate  of 
return  on  money  is  equal  to  the  rate  of  inflation  with  a  negative 
sign.  Consequently,  an  increase  in  the  rate  of  inflation  should  be 
expected  to  lead  to a  fall  in  the  demand  for  money  and  an  increase  in 
the  demand  for  bonds  and  fixed  capital  (enter with  a  negative  sign in 
the  equation determining  the  demand  for  money  and  with a  positive sign 
in the other  two  equations). -9-
3.2 A disequilibrium specification of  the supply function. 
As  it is  outlined  above,  the  three-asset  growth  model  determines  the 
steady-state  growth  conditions  in  "neo-classical"  terms,  with, 
notably,  the rate of  growth of  output  determined by  the rate of growth 
of  the  labour  force  and  the  rate  of  technical  progress.  Full 
employment  of  the  production  factors  is  supposed  to  prevail,  apart 
from  possible cyclical fluctuations.  In recent  years,  however,  several 
researchers  have  underlined  that  significant  changes  have  occurred  in 
the capital/labour ratio and  which  cannot  be  assumed  simply  to reflect 
the  rate  of  technical  progress.  In  fact,  a  part  of  the  rise  in  the 
capital/labour ratio appears  to  be attributable  to  "capital deepening" 
over  and  above  a  "normal"  increase  in  the  stock  of  capital  per 
employed  and  reflecting  the  response  of  enterpreneurs  to 
"monopolistic"  wage  fixing  by  unions.  The  labour  market  may, 
therefore,  not  settle  in  equilibrium  between  supply  and  demand  for 
manpower.  Let  us  for  reasons  of  simplicity assume  that  the  real  wage 
is determined  exogenously.  For  the  enterprises  the  level  of  the  real 
per  capita  wage  is,  thus,  a  given  element  which  in  its  turn  will 
influence  the  desired  level  of  capital  stock  and  output  per  unit  of 
labour. 
As  an  illustration  of  the  argument  let  us  assume  that  the  long  term 
production function  can be  approximated  by  the  Cobb-Douglas  expression 
with disembodied,  Hicks-neutral  technological  progress1: 
(7) 
We  assume,  furthermore,  that  labour  is  compensated  according  to  its 
marginal  product: 
dY  Y  w  =  = (1-a)  (8) 
dL  L 
1  Subscripts  indicating  time  periods  are  omitted  in  the  following 
equations.  The  Cobb-Douglas  specification  is  used  due  to  its 
handiness  but  the  analytical  arguments  are  broadly valid also  for 
a  CES  specification  as  long  as  the  elasticity of  substitution is 
relatively high  in the  longer  term. -10-
Dividing  through with L  in equation  (7)  we  obtain: 
(Y/L)  = ect  (K/L)a  (9) 
which  can  be  introduced  in equation  (8)  to obtain 
w = (1-a)  ect  (K/L)a  (10) 
By  solving equation  (10)  for  K/L  we  obtain: 
K/L  = (((1/(1-a))(w/eCt))1Ja  (11) 
expressing  the  capital/labour ratio as  a  function  of  the  distributive 
share  (a)  and  the  real  wage  (w)  in  proportion  to  the  level  of  factor 
productivity (eCt). 
The  rate  of  return  on  capital  will  in  this  case  be  a  residual 
variable,  determined  by  the  production  function as: 
r  = (Y  - wL)/K  (12) 
or 
r  = (Y/K)  - (wL/K)  (13) 
Although  in practice  the  distributive  share  may  vary  somewhat  notably 
in the  short  run,  the  smooth  adjustment  of  steady state conditions  as 
a  function of  the relative rates of return on  the  three asset  types  as 
assumed  in  equation  1  to  3  above  will  no  longer  prevail  and  the 
process  of  fixed  capital  formation  will  be  influenced  by  the 
difference  between  the  growth of  the  real per capita wage  and  the  rate 
of  technological  progress.  A rise  in this  "real  wage  gap"1  will  then 
tend  to  lead  to  a  rise in the capital/labour ratio  (equation 11).  This 
may  result  in an  increase in the capital/output ratio despite the fact 
that the rate of return on capital will  be  falling  (equation 13). 
1  This  definition  of  the  real  wage  gap  is  radically different  from 
definitions  based  only upon  the  development  of distributive shares 
often used  in the  past. -II-
As  will  be  shown  in section 4  below the actual development  of  the  OECD 
economy  since  1960 has,  in fact,  shown  a  combination  of  a  rise  in  the 
capital/output  ratio  and  a  strong  decline  in  the  rate  of  return  on 
capital.  The  quantitative  analysis  has  therefore  been  based  on  the 
general assumption  that  the  steady state conditions have  not  prevailed 
during  this  period  and  that  the  OECD  economy  has  been  going  through  a 
phase  of  disequilibrium both in the  labour market  and  in the  portfolio 
structure. 
3.3 The  budget constraint and  stock-flow consistency 
The  budget  constraint  specified in equation  4  above  shows  how  the main 
flow  variables  in  the  government  budget  relate  to  the  debt/GDP  and 
base  money/GDP  ratios,  but  does  not  in  itself  add  new  structural 
relationships  to  the  model.  Attention  is,  however,  often  paid  to  the 
budget  balance  as  an  indicator  of  the  fiscal  policy  stance  and  this 
section,  therefore,  examines  further  the  key  budget  balance  concepts 
implicit  in equation  4. 
Equation  4,  in  fact,  as  it  stands,  is  limited  to  the  case  of  steady 
state growth  and  shows  that  the  overall  budget  deficit  (the  left hand 
side  of  the  equation)  in  a  process  of  steady  state  growth  must  be 
equal  to  the  change  in  the  ratio  of  public  liabilities  to  GDP  caused 
by  real  growth  plus  the  inflation  induced  change  in  the  real value  of 
base  money.  In other words  in steady state the overall deficit must  be 
such  as  to  maintain  the  ratio  of  public  debt  and  base  money 
respectively to GDP. 
Expressing  both the left hand  and  the  right hand  side of  equation 4  in 
nominal  terms  (a  trivial  change,  involving  multiplying  all  variables 
in equation  4  with  the  price  index  for  GDP)  the  budget  constraint  can 
be  transformed  to  show  various  budget  balance  concepts  relevant  for 
the  crowding  out analysis. -12-
The  unadjusted nominal  budget  deficit which  is composed  by  the  balance 
on  transactions  excl.  interest  payments  and  interest  payments  on 
public  debt  can  be  expressed as  follows: 
NADF=  D/Y  +  n(B/Y)  (16) 
The  simple  growth  adjusted  budget  budget  balance  is  defined  as  the 
unadjusted nominal  balance  less  the  change  in the  ratio of  public debt 
and  high  powered  money  to  GDP  resulting  from  growth of  nominal  GDP: 
GADF=  D/Y  +  n(B/Y)  - (g+p)((B/Y)+(H/Y))  (17) 
This  budget  balance  definition  is  a  measure  of  the  overall  change  in 
liabilities  of  the  public  sector  in  proportion  to  GDP  and  may, 
therefore,  be  considered  to  be  the most  appropriate  indication of  the 
real  stance  of  fiscal  policy  or  of  potential  (future  or  current) 
crowding  out. 
Finally,  when  the  effect  of  the  actual  change  in  base  money  (as 
opposed  to  the  effect  of  growth  on  the  base  money/GDP  ratio)  is 
deducted  in  the  preceding  budget  balance  definition,  we  obtain  a 
budget  balance expression which  can be  assumed  to  indicate  the size of 
current  crowding  out  (that  is,  total,  potential  crowding  out  less  the 
pure  monetary  "crowding  out"  brought  about  through  a  rise  in  the 
monetary  base  in proportion to  GOP): 
GWDF=  D/Y  +  n(B/Y)  - ((g+p)(B/Y)  +  m(H/Y))  (18) 
As  can  be  easily  seen,  the  two  latter  budget  balance  concepts  are 
equivalent if m=(g+p),  i.e.  if the  rate  of  expansion  of  base  money  is 
equal  to  the  rate of  growth of  nominal  GOP.  The  implication of  this is 
that,  within the  context  of  this  growth  model,  the  change  in  the  base 
money/GDP  ratio is  the  measure  of  the  rate  of  monetary  financing  - in 
analogy  with  the  change  in  the  debt/GDP  ratio  as  a  measure  of  the 
extent  of  bond  financing.  (In  the  following,  quantitative,  analysis -13-
the  sign of  GWDF  is inverted  to  express  the  change  in private holdings 
of  public debt). 
As  pointed  out  in  Cukierman  and  Mortensen  ( 1985)  chapter  4,  the 
conceptual  framework  presented  above  implies  that  the  central  bank  is 
included  in  the  government  sector  and  that  consequently  the 
transactions  between  the  central  bank  and  the  rest  of  the  government 
are netted out.  Conceptually the  flow data,  thus,  should  count  the net 
income  of  the  central  bank  as  a  government  revenue  and  should,  on  the 
other  hand,  deduct  from  the  public  debt  the  part  which  is held  by  the 
central bank as  a  collateral for money.  As  discussed more  in detail in 
the  technical  annex  there  are  good  reasons  to  assume  that  the 
available  public  debt  series  on  the  whole  include  the  government's 
debt  to  the  central  bank  and  that it,  therefore,  could  be  appropriate 
to consolidate  the  public  debt  and  the  base  money  series  by  deducting 
the latter from  the  former  to obtain an  approximation of  the  amount  of 
public  debt  held  by  the  public.  This  procedure  is  questionable  as  a 
general approach as  there may  be  cases where  the  debt  series,  in fact, 
already  excludes  the  government's  debt  to  the  central  bank.  Since,  on 
the  other  hand,  a  systematic  adjustment  of  the  available  series  in 
order  to  obtain conceptually correct statistical definitions is beyond 
the  scope  of  the  present  study,  it has,  nevertheless,  in the  following 
been  assumed  that  the  general  public's  holdings  of  public  debt  best 
can  be  approximated  be  deducting  base  money  from  the  currently 
available data on  public debt. 
A change  in the general public's holdings  of  public  debt  which  is of  a 
transitory  (cyclical)  nature  may,  however,  not  be  expected  to  exert 
the  same  influence  upon  interest rates as  a  regular underlying rise or 
fall  in  the  debt/GDP  ratio.  Indeed,  a  cyclical  weakening  of  activity 
is often associated with a  particular downturn  of  the  stockcycle or of 
fixed  investment  and  may,  therefore,  lead  to  an  increase  in  the 
financial  saving  of  the  enterprise  sector.  To  the  extent  that  this, 
transitory,  rise in financial  saving  of  the enterprise sector is taken 
up  by  a  fall  in  the  financial  saving  of  the  government  sector  one 
would  not  expect  long-term  interest  rates  to  be  affected.  The  budget (3) 
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balance  concept  which  could  be  expected  to  be  the  most  appropriate 
indicator  for  "crowding  out"  and,  thus,  to  show  the  highest 
correlation  with  the  (long-term)  rate  of  interest  would,  therefore, 
seem  to  be  the growth- and cyclically adjusted deficit  less  the  change 
in the  base money/GDP  ratio. 
The  quantitative  evidence  on  the  development  of  the  basic  variables 
will  be  examined  in detail in the  following  section. 
4.  Quantitative findings 
4.1  Facts and  figures:  general  comments 
In  view  of  the  fact  that  interest  rate  developments  in  a  single 
country  - even  in  the  United  States  - are  strongly  influenced  by 
capital  transactions  with  the  rest  of  the  world,  an  attempt  has  been 
made  in  the  present  study  to  overcome  this  analytical  difficulty  by 
operating,  at  least  in  the  initial  phase  of  the  analysis,  with 
aggregate  data  covering  a  large  part  of  the  OECD  area.  The  countries 
included  here  (Denmark,  Germany,  France,  Ireland,  Italy,  the 
Netherlands,  the  United  Kingdom,  the  United  States,  Canada  and  Japan) 
cover about  85%  of  the  OECD  area's  GDP  and  may  therefore  for  practical 
purposes  be  considered  to  represent  the  whole  area,  functioning  in 
important  respects,  although  not  fully,  as  a  closed  economy.  (The 
capital stock and  rate of  return data have  been  generated  on  the basis 
of  statistics  for  the  non-agricultural  business  sector  for  the  six 
major  countries  only.  The  technical  annex  provides  more  detailed 
information  on  sources  and  methods). 
As  seen  from  the  upper  panel  of Graph  1,  the ratio between capital and 
output  in  the  OECD  area,  which  was  declining  in  the  early  1960s, 
started to rise  from  about  1966  and  has  apparently  continued  to  do  so 
up  to  recently,  albeit  with  some  fluctuations  mainly  of  a  cyclical 
nature. -15-
Turning  now  to  the  capital/labour  ratio  and  to  the  real  wage  gap,  it 
is  seen  from  Graph  1  that  the  ratio  of  the  capital  stock  to  total 
hours  worked  has  increased  by  almost  144%  in  the  1960-1984  period. 
Factor  productivity  has  increased  at  a  decelerating  rate  and  in  1984 
was  some  64%  higher  than in  1960.  The  real wage  per  hour  has  increased 
by  124%  over  the  period  as  a  whole,  but  also  at  a  decelerating  rate. 
The  wage  gap,  defined,  as  indicated  above,  as  the  index  of  real wages 
per  hour  divided  by  the  index  of  factor  productivity,  thus,  in  1984 
amounted  to  close  to  40%  as  compared  to  the  situation in 1960. 
The  ratio  of  public  debt  to  GDP  - shown  in  Graph  2  - was  on  a 
declining  trend  until  1974  but  has  since  then  risen  rather  regularly; 
by  1984  it  had  reached  a  level  practically  identical  to  the  one 
observed  for  1960.  Base  money  in proportion to  GDP,  in contrast  to  the 
capital/output  ratio  and  the  public  debt/GDP  ratio,  has  shown  a 
moderately  declining  trend  from  about  10%  of  GDP  in  1961  to  7. 5%  in 
197  4.  Fluctuations  around  this  trend  have,  however,  been  strong  in 
relative  terms.  As  seen  more  clearly  from  Graph  3,  the  base  money/GDP 
ratio  in  relation  to  the  long-term  trend,  thus,  showed  a  sharp  rise 
from  1969  to  1973,  followed  by  a  contraction  lasting  up  to  1981,  with 
only  a  brief  interruption  in  1978.  In  the  period  1982-1984  the  base 
money  I GDP  ratio  has  developed  broadly  in  line  with  the  trend.  The 
private  sector's  holdings  of  public  debt,  which,  as  indicated  above, 
in  this  study is  approximated  by  the  difference  between  the  series  on 
public  debt  and  the  series  on  base  money,  broadly  follow  the 
development  of  the  overall  public  debt,  but  with  a  more  pronounced 
increase  at  the  end  of  the  period,  as  a  reflection  of  the  trendwise 
fall  in the  base  money/GDP  ratio already referred  to above. 
Money  supply  (broad  definition)  has  been  on  a  rising  trend  in 
proportion  to  GDP  over  the  whole  of  the  1961-1984  period,  albeit with 
rather  strong  fluctuations  from  one  year  to  the  next.  Some  further 
details  of  the  monetary  development,  presented  in  Graph  3,  show,  in 
particular,  that  the  percentage  deviation  of  the  base  money/GDP  ratio 
from  its  trend  have  been  larger  than  the  fluctuations  in  the  money -16-
GRAPH  1 
Capital/labour,  capital/output  ratios  and  the  real wage  gap 
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supply.  The  money  market  multiplier,  the  ratio  between  the  money 
supply and  base  money  has  shown  a  considerable rise during  the  period. 
With  respect  to  the  return  on  the  three  categories  of  assets,  it  is 
seen  from  Graph  4  that  the  rate  of  return  on  fixed  capital  was  on  the 
rise  up  to  1967  but  thereafter  has  been  declining,  with  particularly 
sharp  drops  observed  in  1970,  in  1974-75  and  in  1981-82.  In  the 
intermediary periods  a  certain,  cyclically determined,  improvement  was 
observed  but  the  impression of  a  long-term decline  is strong,  at least 
up  to  the very recent  years  where  signs  of  a  stabilisation appear. 
The  nominal  long-term  interest  rate,  on  the  other  hand,  has  exhibited 
a  pronounced  increase  over  the  1961-1984  period  with  a  peak  of  13%  on 
average  for  the  OECD  area  in  1981,  when  a  combination  of  high 
inflation  and  tight  money  (as  shown  in  Graph  3)  created  strong 
tensions  in the  financial  markets.  The  rate  of  inflation  (measured  as 
the  rise  in  the  GOP  deflator)  has  shown  a  different  pattern with  the 
peak  occurring  in  the  wake  of  the  first  oil  price  hike  and  with  a 
clear  subsequent  underlying  slowdown  interrupted  by  the  1979-1980 
acceleration. 
The  difference  between  the  nominal  rate  of  interest  and  the  rate  of 
inflation,  which  can  be  taken - with a  large  degree  of  uncertainty and 
precaution  - as  a  first  approximation  of  the  real  rate  of  interest  on 
bonds,  showed  (even abstracting  from  the  outlying  figures  of  1974-75) 
a  moderately  declining  trend  from  the  mid-1960s  to  about  1978  but  has 
since  then  risen  steeply,  with  the  level  in  1984  actually  exceeding 
the  measured  level  of  the  rate  of  return  on  fixed  capital.  It  is 
difficult  to  assess  the  extent  to  which  the  recent  rise  in  "real'' 
rates contains  transitory elements  but  there would  appear  to  be  little 
doubt  that  a  certain increase  in the  underlying  level of  the  real rate 
has  taken  place  as  compared  to  the  average  level  observed  in  the 
1960s.  Even  with  account  taken  of  possible  transitory  elements  the 
difference  between  the  rate  of  return  on  fixed  capital  and  the  real 
rate  of  return  on  bonds  (the  yield  gap)  thus  seems  to  have  narrowed 
very markedly  since  the  1960s  when  it amounted  (on  a  pre-tax basis)  to 80 
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GRAPH  3 
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GRAPH  4 
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as  much  as  6-7%.  Graph  4  also  shows  a  smoothened  series  for  the  real 
rate  of  interest,  obtained  as  the  moving  three-year  average  of  the 
original  series  and  in  which  the  outlying  observations  of  1974  and 
1975  have  been  replaced  by  a  rough  estimate  of  the  underlying  trend. 
The  latter,  adjusted,  series  is  used  in  the  following  time  series 
analysis  as  the  indicator  of  the  real  rate  of  interest  for  the  OECD 
area as  a  whole. 
4.2 Different  faces  of  the  budget  balance 
As  already  suggested  by  the  development  of  the  public  debt/GDP  ratio, 
the  general  government  budget  balance  has,  on  average  for  the  OECD 
area,  deteriorated significantly during  the  1960-1984  period.  As  shown 
in  Table  1  the  unadjusted  net  lending  of  general  government  in  the 
early  1960s  showed  a  deficit  of  relatively modest  size  in  proportion 
to  GDP.  Indeed,  when  account  is  taken  of  the  growth of  nominal  GDP  the 
balance was  positive,  implying  a  decline  in the  net  debt  in proportion 
to  GDP  as  already  shown  above,  in  Graph  2.  The  level  of  both  the 
unadjusted  and  the  growth-adjusted  budget  balance  is  approximately 
maintained  up  to  1975,  when  a  major  deterioration  is  observed; 
although  with  some  fluctuations  the  aggregate  OECD  budget  deficit 
during  the  following  10  years  remains  much  less  favorable  than  before 
the  1975  recession. 
A  closer  examination  of  these  figures,  however,  suggest  that  cyclical 
fluctuations  have  exerted  a  strong  influence  upon  the  short-term 
variations  in  the  budget  balance.  As  shown  in  the  fourth  column  of 
Table  1  a  tentative adjustment  for  the  impact  of cyclical fluctuations 
upon  the  budget  balance  may  range  from  a  deduction  of  1.  7  points  in 
the  year  1979  when  activity  was  high  in  relation  to  trend  and  a 
positive  adjustment  of  2.1  points  in  1975  when  the  gap  between actual 
and  trend  GDP  was  as  high as  3.6%.  (As  discussed more  in detail in the 
technical  annex,  the  adjustments  for  the  effect  of  cyclical 
fluctuations  are calculated  so  as  to  add  up  to  approximately  zero  over 
the whole  period). (4) 
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Given  that  the  base  money/GDP  ratio  has  been  on  a  declining  trend  on 
average  over  the  1961-1984  period,  "monetary  financing"  in  this  -
narrow  - sense  of  the  expression  has  not  for  the  period  as  a  whole 
contributed  to  the  financing  of  the  public  borrowing  requirement. 
Nevertheless,  the  annual  changes  in  the  monetary  base  as  a  percentage 
of  GDP  fluctuate  between  an  increase  of  0.4%  of  GDP  in  1973  and  a 
decrease  of  0.  5%  of  GDP  in  1981  and  may,  therefore,  on  the  margin, 
have  exerted a  measurable  influence  on  interest rates. 
Since,  moreover,  the  cyclical  adjustment  and  the  effect  of  monetary 
financing  may  go  in  the  same  direction  (notably  in  the  1979-1981 
period)  the  underlying  (cyclically  adjusted)  change  in  the  private 
sector's  holdings  of  public  interest  bearing  debt,  as  presented  in 
column  6  of  Table  2,  may,  in  fact,  in  certain  years  exhibit  an 
evolution  which  is  quite  different  from  the  one  suggested  by  the 
unadjusted  figures  in column  1  (see also  Graph  5). 
In  very  broad  terms,  this  indicator  of  potential  crowding  out  in  the 
OECD  area  shows  that,  in  contrast  to  the  views  expressed  by  certain 
authors,  notably  Blanchard  and  Summers  (1984),  the  government's  claim 
upon  financial  resources  of  the  private  sector  has  shifted  very 
markedly  in  the  course  of  the  1960-1984  period.  In  fact,  on  average 
for  the  years  1961  to  1974,  private holding  of  public  interest bearing 
debt  fell  by  some  1.6  percentage  points  per  year  (cyclically 
adjusted).  In  sharp  contrast  to  the  reduction  observed  from  1961  to 
1974  this  ratio,  on  average  for  the  years  1975  to  1984,  rose  by  0.9 
points  per year,  with a  peak of  1.5 points  in  1981  and  with  the  annual 
increase  remaining  at  or  above  1  point  during  the  1979-1984  period. 
The  shift  in  this  indicator  of  potential  current  crowding  out  between 
the averages  for  1961-1973  and  1979-1984,  thus,  is as  large as  2.8  GDP 
points,  indeed  a  very  significant  change  in  the  government's  claims 
upon  financial  resources  and  which  could  be  expected  to exert  a  strong 
influence upon  the level of interest rates. -23-
Table  1: 
Various  budget  balance definitions  (OECD  Total) 
1961 
62 
63 
64 
65 
66 
67 
68 
69 
70 
71 
72 
73 
74 
75 
76 
77 
78 
79 
80 
81 
82 
83 
84 
Unadjusted 
balance 
(NADF) 
-0,2 
-0,4 
-0,5 
-0,6 
-0,8 
-0,9 
-1,8 
-1,0 
0,3 
-0,3 
-0,9 
-0,9 
-0,1 
-0,8 
-4,4 
-3,1 
-2,3 
-2,6 
-2,0 
-2,6 
-3,1 
-4,3 
-4,5 
-4,0 
Effect  of 
growth of 
nominal 
GDP  on 
debt/GDP 
ratio 
2,5 
2,8 
2,4 
2,9 
2,4 
2,5 
1,8 
2,5 
2,4 
2,0 
1,9 
2,3 
2,8 
2,2 
1,8 
2,7 
2,5 
2,7 
2,9 
2,6 
2,8 
1,7 
2,2 
3,1 
Growth 
adjusted 
balance 
(GADF) 
(1) 
2,3 
2,4 
1,9 
2,3 
1,6 
1,6 
0,0 
1,5 
2,7 
1,7 
1,0 
1,4 
2,7 
1,4 
-2,6 
-0,4 
0,2 
0,1 
0,9 
0,0 
-0,3 
-2,6 
-2,3 
-0,9 
Cyclical 
adjust-
ment 
(2) 
0,1 
0,1 
0,4 
-0,1 
-0,0 
-0,1 
0,2 
-0,4 
-0,8 
0,2 
0,5 
-0,1 
-1,4 
0,5 
2,1 
0,8 
-0,2 
-1,2 
-1,7 
-0,8 
-0,7 
1,3 
1,4 
0,0 
% of  GDP 
Monetary 
financing 
(3) 
-0,1 
-0,3 
0,0 
-0,2 
-0,1 
-0,2 
-0,1 
-0,1 
-0,4 
0,1 
0,1 
0,2 
0,4 
-0,3 
-0,2 
-0,3 
-0,3 
0,2 
-0,3 
-0,4 
-0,5 
0,1 
-0,1 
-0,1 
Net  cycli-
cally ad-
justed chan-
ge  in priva-
te holdings 
of  public 
debt 
(GWDF)  (4) 
-2,3 
-2,2 
-2,3 
-2,0 
-1,5 
-1,3 
-0,1 
-1,0 
-1,5 
-2,0 
-1,6 
-1,5 
-1,7 
-1,6 
0,7 
-0,1 
0,3 
0,9 
1,1 
1,2 
1,5 
1,2 
1,0 
1,0 
(1)  Unadjusted  budget  balance as  corrected for  the effect on  the ratio of  public 
liabilities to  GOP  of  the  change  in nominal  GDP. 
(2)  Adjustment  for  the  estimated effect on  the  budget  balance of  the  gap  between 
actual  real  GDP  and  the  trend.  (For  a  further  discussion  of  the calculation 
of  the  effect  of  cyclical  fluctuations  on  the  budget  deficit  see  the 
technical annex). 
(3)  Percentage points  change  in the  base  money/GDP  ratio. 
( 4)  Growth-adjusted  budget  balance  as  corrected  for  the  effect  of  cyclical 
fluctuations  and  monetary  financing  (column  3  plus  column  4  plus  column  5) 
(with inverted sign). 3 
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GRAPH  5 
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5.  Econometric  analysis 
As  already  pointed  out  above  the  actual  development  of  the  OECD 
economy  since  1960  has  not  followed  a  steady-state  growth  path.  In 
addition  to  cyclical  fluctuations  in  activity  the  basic  asset 
structure appears  to  have  been  influenced,  in particular,  by  a  process 
of capital deepening  and  a  rise in the capital/output ratio despite  a 
pronouced  fall  in  the  real  rate  of  return  on  capital ~  a  market 
increase in the  real rate of  interest.  Econometric  analysis  using  the 
steady-state  model,  therefore,  gives  results  that  are  incompatible 
with  the  conceptual model  developed  in equation  1-3  above. 
The  econometric  analysis  presented  in  the  present  paper,  therefore, 
has  been based  on  the modified conceptual  framework  including  the  real 
wage  gap,  the  real  rate  of  interest  and  the  rate  of  increase  in 
high-powered  money  as  the  main  determining  variables.  This  chapter 
first looks  briefly at  the  bilateral correlations  in this  system  ~nd 
then  presents  a  time  series  analysis  of  the  development  of  the  main 
ratios  in  the  model.  A  reduced  form  analysis  of  the  effect  on  the 
real  rate  of  interest  of  the  budget  balance  is  presented  in the  third 
section  of  this  chapter  and  the  stability  of  these  results  are 
examined  in  section  5.5.  Section  5.6  and  5.7  finally  present  a 
cross-section analysis  of  the key  relations in this conceptual  model. 
5.1 A review of bilateral correlations 
As  seen  from  Table  2,  which  presents  a  schematic  overview of  the  sign 
and  strength  of  the  bilateral  correlations  (the  table  of  bilateral 
correlation coefficients  is  given  in  the  technical  annex),  the  actual 
behaviour  of  the  OECD  economy  seems  to  correspond  relatively well  to 
the  conceptual model  outlined above: 
- the  real  wage  gap  - (WPRO:  the  real  wage  per  hour  worked  divided  by 
the  index  of  factor  productivity)  - appears  to  be  strongly  and 
positively  correlated  with  the  capital/output  ratio  and  the 
capital/labour ratio; -26-
- the  real  rate  of  interest  (RLAN:  the  nominal  long-term  rate  of 
interest  less  the  rise  in  the  GDP  deflator,  calculated  as  a  moving 
average  with  a  reduced  weight  for  outlying  observations  in 
1974/1975)  appears  to  be  strongly  correlated  with  the  public 
debt/GDP  ratio  and  even  more  so  with  the  private  holdings  of  public 
debt. 
- a  striking  phenomenon  is  the  strong  triangular  correlation  between 
the  real wage  gap,  the capital/output ratio and  the level of nominal 
interest  rates.  This  may  perhaps  be  interpreted  as  an  indication 
that  the rise  in  the  wage  gap  and  the  consequential  increase  in  the 
capital/output  ratio  may  have  been  one  of  the  factors  behind  the 
rise in nominal  interest rates. 
In  any  case,  however, 
covariance  matrix  of 
spurious  correlations  may  easily  occur  in  a 
this  size  and  a  deeper  analysis  of  the 
quantitative  evidence  is,  therefore,  required  before  conclusions  can 
be  drawn. 
The  following  sections  present  and  examine  regression  analysis  of  the 
capital/  output  and  capital/labour  ratios  and  of  the  debt/GDP  ratios. 
No  attempt  is made  to analyse money  demand  equations. 
5.2  The  capital/output and  capital/labour ratios 
The  bilateral  correlation  coefficient  between  the  real  wage  gap  and 
the  capital/output  ratio  is,  at  0,785,  relatively  high  and  also 
statistically significant.  Analysis  of  the  details  of  the  regression, 
however,  shows  that  changes  in  the  wage  gap,  despite  this  strong 
overall  correlation,  cannot  provide  a  satisfactory description of  the 
fluctuations  from  one  year  to  another  in  the  capital/output  ratio.  In 
fact,  as  seen  from  Table  3,  the  value  of  the  Durbin-Watson  statistic 
is extremely  low,  suggesting a  considerable  amount  of auto-correlation 
of  the  residuals.  One  obvious  explanation  for  this  result  may  be  that 
the  capital/output  ratio  (as  already  suggested  in  section  3.2  above) 
can react  only with a  certain lag  to  changes  in the wage  gap  and  that, -27-
Table  2 
Covariance matrix of variables  and  parameters 
(sign and  size of bilateral correlation coefficients) 
Real  wage  gap 
Real  long  term interest 
Inflation 
Long  term interest rate 
Short  term interest rate 
Public debt  % of  GOP 
Private holdings  of public debt 
Capital/output ratio 
Capital/labour ratio 
Base  money/GOP 
WPRO 
RLAN 
PGDP 
LINT 
SINT 
GONO 
PROG 
CAPY 
CALO 
BMNP 
Base  money/GOP  % dev.  from  trend  BMNT 
% change  in base money  BMCH 
Money  supply/GOP  SMNP 
Money  supply/GOP  % dev.  from  trend  SMNT 
% change  in money  supply  SMCH 
Government  net  lending  NADF 
Growth-adjusted  budget  balance  GAOF 
Change  in private holdings 
of  public  debt  GWOF 
WPRO 
00 
+ 
++ 
+++ 
+++ 
0 
0 
+++ 
+++ 
0 
0 
+++ 
0 
0 
+++ 
RLAN  PGDP 
0 
00 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+++ 
+++ 
++ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
0 
0 
+ 
++ 
+ 
00 
++ 
++ 
+ 
++ 
+ 
0 
++ 
0 
+ 
+ 
LINT 
+++ 
+ 
++ 
00 
+++ 
0 
0 
+++ 
+++ 
0 
0 
+++ 
+ 
0 
+++ 
+  Positive correlation (+=0,26-0,50,  ++=0,51-0,75,  +++=0,76-1,0 
- :  Negative  correlation (-=0,26-0,50,  --=0,51-0,75,  ---=0,76-1,0 
0  Correlation weak  (-0,25()+0,25). 
SINT 
+++ 
+ 
++ 
+++ 
00 
0 
0 
+++ 
+++ 
0 
0 
+++ 
+ 
0 
+++ -28-
thus,  the  actually  observed  ratio  is  unlikely  to  represent  the  level 
desired by  the  entrepreneurs.  A correction for  the  auto-correlation of 
the  residuals  (the  Corchran-Orcutt  correction),  in  fact,  yields  a 
substantially more  satisfactory result,  including  a  higher coefficient 
for  the  real  wage  gap.  Another,  generally  applied  method  for 
estimating  the  relative  importance  of  adjustment  lags  is  to  introduce 
a  "Koyck  lag"  (the  lagged  dependent  variable)  in  the  regression,  the 
size of  the  coefficient  of  this variable  being  interpreted  as  a  first 
indication  of  the  speed  with  which  the  dependent  variable  adjust  to 
changes  in  the  other  variables.  A  value  of  the  "Koyck-coefficient" 
close  to  one,  thus,  indicates  a  relatively  slow  adjustment  process, 
while  a  value  close  to  zero,  other  things  being  equal,  indicates  a 
rapid  adjustment1.  Table  3  shows  for  the  capital/output  ratio  the 
results of  this approach which may  be  summarised  as  follows: 
- the  capital/output  ratio  shows  a  considerable  degree  of  short-term 
inertia; 
- the  coefficient  of  the  dominant  independent  variable  (the  real  wage 
gap),  which  is  high  and  significant  in  the  simple  bilateral 
equation,  is  substantially  reduced  and  also  loses  statistical 
significance when  the  lagged  dependent  variable is introduced  in the 
equation. 
- the  long  run  value  of  the  coefficient  of  the  real  wage  gap  in  the 
equation  including  the  lagged  dependent  variable  is  at 
0,212/(1-0,721)=0,76)  higher  even  than  in  the  simple  bilateral 
equation. 
1  The  long  run  value  of  the  coefficient  can  be  calculated  from  the 
equation y  =  a+bx+CY-1  as  b'=b/(1-c).  The  speed  of  adjustment  is 
equivalent  to  (1-c).  If for  example  c=  0,8  only 0,2  of  the effect 
of  a  change  in  "x"  will  be  felt in the first  period. -29-
Table  3 
Regression equations  for  the  capital/output ratio  (OECD  Total) 
1.  Simple  bilateral regression 
CAPY  = 39,716 + 0,540  WPRO 
(5,497)  (8,971) 
2.  With  lagged  dependent 
CAPY  = 4,158 +  0,212  WPRO  +  0,721  CAPY(-1) 
(0,622)  (3,105)  (6,197) 
3.  With  lagged  dependent  and  full  specification 
CAPY  19,375 - 0,160  WPRO  + 1,710  RLAN 
(3,375)  (-1,653)  (5,508) 
+ 1,684  PGDP  + 0,874  CAPY(-1) 
(5,512)  (6,991) 
CAPY  = Capital/output ratio 
R-sq 
0,785 
R-sq 
0,935 
R-sq 
0,979 
D-W 
0,451 
D-W 
1,617 
D-l-1 
2,777 
WPRO  = Real  wage  gap  (index  for  real  compensation  per  hour  divided  by  the  index 
for  total factor  productivity). 
RLAN  Real  rate of  interest  (adjusted,  moving  3-year average). 
PGDP  Change  in  GOP  deflator. 
NOTE:  T-values  are  indicated in parenthesis  under  the coefficients. (5) 
-30-
These  results clearly suggest  that,  although  there  is broad  and  strong 
consistency  between  the  conceptual  framework  and  the  actual  behaviour 
of  the  capital/output  ratio  on  one  side  and  the  real  wage  gap  on  the 
other side  there  is little hope  of  obtaining  an  exact  tracking  of  the 
year-to-year  movements  of  the  former  as  a  function  of  the  changes  in 
the  real  wage  gap.  Moreover,  a  full  specification  including  the  real 
rate  of  interest  and  the  rate  of  inflation  (equation  3  in  Table  3) 
yields  parameter values  out  of  line with expectations. 
As  far  as  the  relation  between  the  real  wage  gap  and  the 
capital/labour  ratio  is  concerned,  the  findings  are  on  some  points 
different.  The  simple  bilateral  regression  equation  yields  a  high  and 
significant coefficient  for  the  real wage  gap  (WPRO).  Introducing  the 
lagged  dependent  variable  in  the  equation,  in  order  to  analyse  the 
adjustment  process,  however,  entails  a  substantial  reduction  both  of 
the  value  of  the  coefficient  of  the  real  wage  gap  and  of  its 
statistical  significance  (reduction  of  the  T-value).  The  long  run 
value  of  the  coefficient  of  the  real  wage  gap,  however,  remains  close 
to  the  "static"  value  in  equation  1,  suggesting  that  the  main 
difficulty is  to specify the pattern of  adjustment. 
An  adaptive  model  for  the  capital/labour  ratio,  including  the  real 
rate of  interest and  the  rate of  inflation (full specification)  yields 
negative  coefficients  for  both  these  variables.  This  is  in  line  with 
the  hypothesis  as  far  as  the  coefficient  of  the  real  rate of  interest 
is concerned  but  contrary  to  the  hypothesis  as  fas  as  the  coefficient 
of  the  rate  of  inflation  is  concerned.  Moreover,  the  similar 
specification  for  the  capital/output  ratio  gave  positive  values  for 
both  these  coefficients,  suggesting  that  a  regression  of  time  series 
along  these  lines,  while  perhaps  a  feasible  way  to  verify  the  main 
correlations  in  the  model,  is  not  appropriate  for  estimating 
cross-elasticities. 
These  regression  results,  nevertheless,  suggest  the  strong  conclusion 
that  changes  in  the  capital/labour  ratio  apart  from  a  certain - 31-
Table  4 
Regression equations  for  the capital/labour ratio  (OECD  Total) 
1.  Simple  bilateral regression 
CALO  -218,300 + 3,274  WPRO 
(-16,649)  (29,963) 
2.  With  lagged  dependent 
CALO  = -9,860 + 0,280  WPRO  + 0,920  CAL0(-1) 
(-0,313)  (0,535)  (6,343) 
3.  With  lagged  dependent  and  full  specification 
CALO  =  -26,875 + 0,458  WPRO  - 2,264  RLAN 
(-0,893)  (1,036)  (-2.358) 
- 2,450  PGDP  +  0,987  CAL0(-1) 
(-3,551)  (6,755) 
CALO  Capital/labour ratio,  1960=100 
R-sq 
0,976 
R-sq 
0,99 
R-sq 
0,995 
D-W 
0,494 
D-W 
1,947 
D-W 
2,391 
WPRO  =  Real  wage  gap  (index  for  real  compensation  per  hour  divided  by  the  index 
for  total factor  productivity). 
RLAN  =Real rate of  interest  (adjusted,  3-year moving  average). 
PGDP  =  Change  in  GDP  deflator. -32-
adjustment  lag  can  be  largely  explained  by  the  changes  in  the  real 
wage  gap. 
5.3 The  public debt/GDP  ratio 
An  examination  of  the  relation  between  the  real  rate  of  interest  and 
the  public  debt/GDP  ratio,  following  the  same  approach  as  for  the 
capital/output  and  the capital/labour ratios,  provides  a  comparatively 
strong  confirmation  of  the  working  hypothesis  as  expressed  in  the 
conceptual  framework: 
- the  simple  bilateral  correlation  yields  an  R-square  of  0,656  and  a 
coefficient  of  the  real  rate  of  interest  of  2,4.  The  D-W  statistic 
is  low,  but  a  correction  for  the  autocorrelation  of  the  residuals, 
while  dramatically  increasing  the  D-W  st
1
atistic,  does  not 
significantly  reduce  the  coefficient  of  the  r~al  rate  of  interest 
or its statistical significance; 
- introducing  the  lagged  dependent  variable  (the  "Koyck-lag")  entails 
a  certain  lowering  of  the  coefficient  of  the  real  rate  of  interest 
but without  rendering it statistically insignificant.  Moreover,  the 
long  run  value  of  the  coefficient  of  the  real  rate  of  interest  is 
even  higher  (3,23)  than  the  "static  value"  and  the  adjustment  is 
relatively fast; 
- an  attempt  to  estimate  cross-elasticities  by  introducing  the  real 
wage  gap  and  the  rate  of  inflation  in  this  equation  (regression  3) 
does  not  yield  convincing results.  Neither  a  specification using  the 
absolute value nor  one  using  the  change  from  one  year  to  the next  in 
the  independent  variables,  in  fact,  yield  statistically significant 
coefficients and  do  not  improve  the overall fit. 
The  fitted  equations  for  the  ratio  of  privately  held  public  debt  (as 
approximated  by  the  difference  between  the  total  public  debt  and  the 
base money)  show  the  same  overall  performance  as  the  equations  for  the 
public  debt/GDP  ratio,  but  with  higher  and  statistically  more -33-
Table  5 
Regression equations  for  public  debt/GDP  ratio  (OECD  Total) 
1.  Simple bilateral regression 
GOND  =  20,241  +  2,404  RLAN  R-sq  D-W 
(31,068)  (6,482)  0,656  0,263 
2.  With  lagged  dependent 
GOND  =  5,932  +  1,075  RLAN  +  0,677  GOND(-1)  R-sq  D-W 
(2,854)  (4,120)  (6,900)  0,921  1,106 
3.  With  lagged  dependent  and  full  specification 
GOND  =  -7,965 +  0,510  RLAN  +  0,077  WPRO 
(-1,567)  (1,539)  (1,701) 
+0,050  PGDP  +  0,897  GOND(-1)  R-sq  D-W 
(0,201)  (8,076)  0,95  2,125 
GOND  =  Public  debt/GDP  ratio 
WPRO  =  Real  wage  gap  {index  for  real  compensation  per  hour  divided  by  the  index 
for  total factor  productivity). 
RLAN  =Real rate of  interest  {adjusted,  moving  3-year average,  see  section 4.1). 
PGDP  Change  in the  GDP  deflator. -34-
significant coefficients for  the  real rate of  interest: 
- in the  simple bilateral regression,  the coefficient of  the  real rate 
of  interest  amounts  to  2, 716  as  against  2,404  in  the  equation  for 
total  public  debt  and  with a  T-value of  8,212  as  against  6,482; 
- in  the  specifications  including  the  lagged  dependent  variable  the 
coefficient  of  the  current  value  of  the  real  rate  of  interest 
remains  significant  (although  of  course  with  a  lower  value).  The 
long  run coefficient of  the real rate of  interest is, at 3,66,  large 
and  the  speed of  adjustment  quite rapid. 
The  figures  in Tables  5  and,  notably,  6,  thus,  provide  evidence  of  a 
strong  and  relatively  contemporaneous  link  between  the  real  rate  of 
interest and  the  amount  of  government  debt  held  by  the  general  public 
but  do  not  allow  conclusions  concerning  the  cross-elasticities  (the 
influence  of  the  rate  of  return  on  fixed  capital  on  the  public 
debt/GOP  ratio etc.). 
5.4  Impact  of  the fiscal deficit on  the  real rate of interest 
Although  in  Tables  5  and  6,  above,  the  real  rate  of  interest  is 
assumed  to  be  the  "independent"  variable  determining  the  debt/GOP 
ratio,  the  relation  between  the  two  variables  must  be  interpreted  as 
being  of  an  interactive  nature,  with  the  level  of  the  real  rate  of 
interest  and  the  debt/GOP  ratio  determined  simultaneously  within  a 
general  macro-economic  framework.  To  the  extent  that  an  influence  is 
exerted  from  the  debt/GOP  ratio  on  the  real  rate  of  interest,  it may 
depend  both  upon  the  level  of  the  ratio  and  upon  its  change  from  one 
year  to another,  as  simulated  by  the appropriately adjusted  government 
budget  balance. 
As  already  pointed  out  above,  the  budget  balance  concept  which  can  be 
assumed  to  most  accurately measure  the  change  in  the  private  sector's 
holdings  of  public  debt  and,  thus,  to  represent  the  underlying 
"crowding  out"  effect  is  the  government  net  lending  as  adjusted  for -35-
Table  6 
Regression equations  for private holdings  of  public debt 
1.  Simple  bilateral regression 
PROG  =  10,576 +  2,716  RLAN 
(12,341)  (8,212) 
2.  With  lagged  dependent 
PROG  =  2,870 +  1,166  RLAN  +  0,681  PROG(-1) 
(1,968)  (3,402)  (5,427) 
3.  With  lagged  dependent  and  full  specification 
PROG  = -9,113 +  0,549  RLAN  +  0,071  WPRO 
(-2,235)  (1,596)  (1,591) 
+0,150  PGDP  +  0,929  PROG(-1) 
(0,616)  (7,938) 
PROG  = Private holdings  of  public debt. 
R-sq 
0,754 
R-sq 
0,921 
R-sq 
0,959 
D-W 
0,314 
D-W 
0,828 
D-W 
1,980 
WPRO  = Real  wage  gap  (index  for  real  compensation  per  hour  divided  by  the  index 
for  total factor productivity). 
RLAN  =Real rate of  interest  (adjusted,  moving  3-year average,  see  section 4.1). 
PGDP  = Change  in  GDP  deflator. -36-
three main  elements: 
- the effect on  the  public  debt/GDP  ratio of  growth  of  nominal  GDP; 
- the  impact  on  the  budget  balance  of  cyclical  fluctuations  in 
activity; 
- the effect of  changes  in the base money/GDP  ratio. 
Moreover,  in an  open  economy,  capital transaction with  the rest of  the 
world  may,  but  will  not  necessarily,  influence  the  level  of  the  real 
rate of  interest. 
The  budget  balance  adjusted  as  indicated  can  be  considered  an 
approximation of  the  change  in the  private sector's holdings  of  public 
debt,  but will not  be  exactly equivalent  to  the  observed  change  in the 
stock variable.  The  latter may,  in fact,  be  influenced also by various 
adjustments,  such as  revaluations,  indexation etc. 
In  fact,  as  shown  in  Table  7,  the  approximated  change  in  private 
holdings  of  public  debt  appears  to  exert  a  strong  and  significant 
impact  upon  the  real  rate  of  interest,  when  estimated  in  an  adaptive 
framework  of  somewhat  the  same  nature  as  the  one  used  above  in  the 
analysis of  the  three basic structural equationsl. 
The  coefficient  of  the  change  in  the  private  sector's  holdings  of 
public  debt  (equation  3)  is positive  (equal  to  0,3)  and  statistically 
significant  even  after  correction  for  the  auto-correlation  of 
residuals.  Indeed,  the  equation  in  the  third  part  of  Table  7, 
reproduced  below  for  convenience,  suggests  a  strong  and  cumulative 
impact  emanating  from  the  budget  balance,  in  so  far  as  a  positive 
1  The  equations  in  Table  7  may  be  interpreted  as  various  simplified 
and  linearized  reduced  form  versions  of  the  structural  equations 
presented  in  section  3  but  are  also  consistent  with  other 
specifications of  the stock/flow interaction. -37-
Table  7 
The  effect  on  the  real rate of  interest of  various  budget  balance definitions 
1.  With  unadjusted  budget  balance 
RLAN  = -0,312  - 0,268  NADF  +  0,999  RLAN(-1) 
(-1,819)(-3,926)  (14,937) 
2.  With growth-adjusted  budget  balance 
RLAN  = 0,285  - 0,230  GADF  +  1,016  RLAN(-1) 
(1,634)(-3,446)  (14,596) 
3.  With  change  in private holdings  of  public debt 
RLAN  = 0,287  +  0,298  GWDF  +  1,017  RLAN(-1) 
(1,781)  (4,012)  (15,680) 
4.  With  stock of  and  change. in private holdings  of  public 
RLAN  = -2,214 +  0,285  PROG(-1)  +  0,419  GWDF 
(-3,551)  (7,527)  (3,089) 
5.  With  stock and  change  in private holdings  of  public 
debt  and  lagged  dependent 
RLAN  = -0,452 +  0,0698  PROG(-1)  +  0,309  GWDF 
(-1,184)  (2,104)  (4,494) 
+0,834  RLAN(-1) 
(7,891) 
R-sq 
0,938 
R-sq 
0,932 
R-sq 
0,940 
debt 
R-sq 
0,791 
R-sq 
0,951 
D-W 
1,161 
D-W 
1,166 
D-W 
1,362 
D-W 
0,494 
D-W 
1,543 
WPRO  = Real  wage  gap  (index  for  real  compensation  per  hour  divided  by  the  index 
for  total factor  productivity). 
WPRO  (%ch)  = Percentage  change  in real wage  gap  from  one  year  to another. 
RLAN  Real  rate of  interest  (adjusted,  moving  3-year average) 
NADF  General  government  net  lending  (unadjusted). 
GADF  = General  government  net  lending  or  borrowing  ajusted  for  the effect  on  the 
debt/GDP  ratio of  growth of  nominal  GDP  (growth-adjusted  budget  balance). 
GWDF  = Effect  on  the  private  holdings  of  public  debt  (growth-adjusted  budget 
balance  adjusted  for  cyclical  fluctuations  and  base  money  financing  -
with  inverted sign). 
PROG  =  Calculated private holdings  of  public  debt  as  % of  GDP. -38-
value  of  this  variable  (a  rise  in  the  private  sector's  holdings  of 
public  debt)  will  exert  a  persistent  upward  pressure  upon  interest 
rates: 
RLAN  0,287  +  0,298GWDF  +  1,017RLAN(-1) 
where  RLAN=the  real  rate  of  interest,  '-1'  means  the  variable  lagged 
one  period  and  GWDF=the  estimated  change  in  the  private  sector's 
holdings  of  public  debt  defined  as  indicated  above.  It  should  be 
noted,  however,  that  although  the fit of  the equation using  the  change 
in  private  holdings  of  public  debt  is  marginally  better  than  the  fit 
obtained  using  the  unadjusted  budget  balance,  the  difference  between 
the  two  estimates  is  not  large.  Although  the  various  adjustments  of 
the  budget  balance  can  be  justified  an  conceptual  grounds,  the 
explicative value,  in purely econometrica!  terms,  of  these  adjustments 
is,  thus,  not  very  large.  This  fact  is mainly attributable  to  the  high 
correlation  between  the  various  budget  balance  definitions  when 
expressed  in  the  form  of  time  series  for  the  OECD  area as  a  whole.  As 
will  be  shown  below,  the  adjustments,  however,  are  indispensable  for 
the  purpose  of  cross-section analysis. 
The  regressions  in equations  2  and  3  in  Table  7,  however,  both  yield 
coefficients  of  the  lagged  dependent  variable  which  are  above  1, 
suggesting  an  upward  trend  in  the  real  rate  of  interest  even  without 
any  impact  from  the  fiscal  variable.  This  may  be  an  indication  that 
the  specification  is  incomplete  and  that  other  variables  may  play  a 
role.  In  fact,  the  inclusion  of  the  stock variable  (private holdings 
of  public  debt)  in  equations  4  and  5  yield  a  more  convincing  result, 
with  acceptable  and  significant  values  of  all  coefficients  and,  in 
equation  5,  an acceptable value also  for  the  D-W  statistic. 
Despite  the  problems  of identification of coefficients,  the regression 
results,  notably  in  equation  5,  are  fully  consistent  with  and 2  in 
fact,  strongly underpin  the hypothesis  that  the  sharp deterioration in 
real  fiscal  balances  since  the  late  1970s  is  the  main,  if  not 
necessarily the only,  factor behind  the rise in real rates of interest -39-
in  the  early 1980s.  The  subsequent  examination of  stability problems, 
on  the  other  hand,  suggests  that  the  .. crowding  out  ..  effects  have  been 
considerably stronger in the  1970s and,  notably,  the  1980s  than in the 
1960s  - where,  in  any  case,  public  debt  was  on  the  decline  for  the 
OECD  area  as  a  whole  and  where,  consequently,  no  crowding  out 
phenomena  can  be  assumed  to  have  occurred. 
5.5 Stability of coefficients 
In order  to  test the stability of  the  structural equations  some  of  the 
key  regressions  presented  in  Table  7  above  have  been  estimated  for 
varios  sub-periods using  two  approaches: 
- a  testing  of  forward  stability by  estimating first  the  equation  for 
the  period  1962  to  1973  and  then successively re-estimating  the  same 
equation adding  one  year at  the  end  of  the  period; 
- a  testing of  the  backward  stability by estimating first  the equation 
for  the  period  1973  to  1984  and  then  successively re-estimating  the 
same  equation adding  one  year at  the  beginning  of  the  period. 
A first  impression  of  the  results  of  the  stability tests  is  given  in 
Table  8  which  shows  the  value  of  coefficients  in  the  key  equations as 
estimated  for  the  following  periods:  1962  to  1984,  1962  to  1973  and 
1973  to  1984.  Details  of  the  intermediary  results  are  presented  in 
graphic  form  in  the  annex.  Combining  the  two  sets  of  stability 
information the  following  conclusions are  suggested: 
- the  effect  of  the  current  increase  in  private  holdings  of  public 
debt  on  the  real  rate  of  interest  seems  to  have  been  considerably 
stronger  in  the  period  subsequent  to  1973:  the  coefficients  both  of 
the  flow variable  (GWDF)  and  of  the  stock variable  (PROG)  are  small 
and  insignificant  when  estimated  for  the  period  1962  to  1973  but 
high  and  significant  when  estimated  for  the  period  1973  to  1984. 
Consequently  the  coefficient  of  the  lagged  dependent  variable  is -40-
Table  8 
Stability of  key  coefficients 
Value  of coefficient (1) 
Dependent  Independent 
variable  variable  1962-84  1962-73  1973-84 
RLAN  PROG(-1)  0,0698  0,0338  0,0372 
(Real  long  (2,1045)  (1,101)  (0,2476) 
term rate  GWDF  0,309  0,0337  0,4343 
of  interest)  (4,4943)  (0,1943)  (1,6621) 
(Table  7,  eq.  5)  RLAN(-1)  0,834  1,1785  0,8897 
(7,8908)  (4,4723)  (2,5769) 
RLAN  GWDF  0,2976  -0,1049  0,4792 
(Real  long  (4,0121)  (-0,8686)  (2,6963) 
term rate  RLAN(-1)  1,0173  1,4179  0,9719 
of interest)  (15,6801)  (9,4171)  (10,9051) 
(Table  71  eg.3) 
(1)  T-value in Earenthesis -41-
much  higher  when  estimated  for  1962  to  1973  than  for  1973  to  1984, 
suggesting  than  the  lags  of  adjustment  of  the  real  rate  of  interest 
to  changes  in  the  stance  of  fiscal  policy  have  been  shortened.  This 
would  seem  to  provide  some  confirmation of  the  thesis  that  the  scope 
for  influencing  real 
significantly  reduced 
demand  through  fiscal  policy  has  been 
in  the  1970s  as  a  result  of  a 
faster-than-earlier  pushing  up  of  real rates of  interest. 
The  stability  tests  - and  notably  the  estimates  of  coefficients  for 
the  two  main  sub-periods,  1962-7  3  and  197 3-84,  - suggest  that  the 
effect  of  fiscal  deficits  on  the  real  rate  of  interest  has  been 
stronger  and  notably  more  rapid  in  the  last  ten  years  or  so  than  in 
the  period  up  to  1973.  "crowding  out"  effects,  thus,  are  likely  to 
have  been stronger in the  1980s  than in the early years of  the  25  year 
period examined here. 
5.6 A review of  evidence  based  on  cross-section data 
Despite various adjustments  for  serial correlation and  stability tests 
such  as  those  referred  to  above  it is difficult  to  overcome  the basic 
weakness  inherent  in  time-series  analysis:  the  identification  problem 
resulting  from  the  fact  that,  as  already  indicated  above,  the  data 
represent  ex  post  observations  of  points  of  equilibrium  but  do  not 
provide  information on  the underlying  "tension"  which may  have  induced 
a  change  in  the  desired  value  of  a  certain variable,  for  example  the 
level  of  private  holdings  of  public  debt  in  proportion  to  GDP  or  the 
real rate of interest. 
Since  economics  offer  no  possibility  for  carrying  out  a  controlled 
scientific  experiment  involving  changes  in  only  one  exogenous 
variable,  the  only  response  to  the  identification  problem  inherent  in 
time-series  analysis  is  to  examine  data  for  several  countries  in 
different  relative  positions  which  respect  to  the  relevant  criteria, 
and  with  the  hope  that  this  additional  information  at  best  will 
confirm  and  at  least  will  not  contradict  the  results  of  the 
time-series analysis.  This  section,  therefore,  presents  an examination % change 
-42-
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of  data  for  the  six  major  OECD  countries  with  the  aim  of  testing 
further  two  key  postulates  of  the  present  study:  the  effect  of  the 
real  wage  gap  on  the  capital/labour  ratio  and  the  effect  of  the  real 
fiscal deficit  on  the  real rate of interest. 
As  shown  in  Graph  6,  which  plots  the  average  annual  percentage  change 
in the  capital/labour ratio  (vertical axis) against  the average  annual 
percentage  change  in  the  real  wage  gap  (horizontal  axis)  for  the  six 
major  OECD  countries  and  for  three  sub-periods:  1970/60,  1980/70  and 
1984/80,  the  cross-section data  show  a  broad  and  significant  positive 
correlation  between  these  two  variables:  the  coefficient  of  '1,16'  of 
the  change  in  the  real  wage  gap,  indeed,  indicates  a  strong  tendency 
for  an  increase  in  the  real  wage  gap  to  be  fully  compensated  by  a 
combination  of  an  increase  in  the  stock  of  capital  and  a  fall  in 
employment.  As  seen  from  Table  9  the  coefficient  of  the  real  wage  gap 
is  statistically  significant  (T-value=2, 762)  but  the  overall  fit  of 
the  equation  is  not  very  good,  suggesting  that  other  factors  than 
changes  in  the  real  wage  gap  influence  the  relative  positions  of  the 
individual  countries  and  changes  over  time  in  these  positions.  It is 
tempting  to  assume  that  cross-country differences  with  respect  to  the 
level  of  real  rates  of  interest  could  be  an  explicative  element  in 
this  equation  but  the  introduction  of  the  real  rate  of  ~nterest into 
the  equation  for  the  capital/labour  ratio  does  not  yield  a 
statistically  significant  improvement  of  the  fit  (see  the  second 
equation in Table  9). 
Cross-section  data  also  confirm  the  finding  of  a  strong  correlation 
between  the  calculated  change  in  domestic  p·rivate  holdings  of 
financial  assets  (changes  in  private  holdings  of  public  debt  less 
borrowing  or  lending  of  the  nation)  and  the  real  rate  of  interest. 
Graph  7,  which  presents  the  data  for  the  same  countries  as  above  with 
averages  for  the  periods  1961-1970,  1971-1980  and  1981-1984,  shows 
that  high  values  of  the  change  in  domestic  private  holdings  of 
financial  assets  are  associated  with  high  values  of  the  real  rate  of 
interest  and  vice  versa.  A  significant  exception  is  the  position  of 
the  United  Kingdom  for  the  period  1961-1970  where  the  real  rate  of -44-
Table  9-
Cross-section analysis  (1)  of  the correlation between  the  real wage  gap  and 
the capital/labour ratio. 
(%  change  in the capital/labour ratio and  % change  in the  real wage  gap} 
Dependent 
variable 
CALO 
CALO 
= 
= 
Const.  Indep.  variable 
2,833 + 1,159 WPRO 
(3,532)  (2,762) 
2,518 + 1,231  WPRO  + 0,085  RLAN 
(2,209)  (2,633)  (0,399) 
R-sq 
0,323 
0,330 
(1)  Countries:  Germany,  France,  Italy,  United Kingdom,  United  States,  Japan. 
Periods:  1961-1970,  1971-1980,  1981-1984. -45-
interest  appears  substantially higher  than  warranted  by  the  financial 
variable.  This  may  be  explained by  the  special  problems  encountered  by 
the  United Kingdom  in the  1960s  as  a  result  of  the  "sterling balances" 
(sterling  deposits  and  other  assets  held  by  non-residents)  and  which 
may  have  led  to  a  more  prudent  monetary  policy  than  would  otherwise 
have  been  the  case  and,  indeed,  was  a  main  argument  for  running  a 
tight  fiscal  policy  in  the  United  Kingdom  during  this  period.  As  seen 
from  Table  10,  a  regression  based  on  a  set  of  data  adjusted  for  the 
special UK-positionl  yields  a .very significant  improvement  of  the fit, 
as  regards  both  the  overall  R-square  and  the  T-value  of  the 
coefficient.  On  the  other  hand,  the  coefficient  of  the  change  in  the 
private  holdings  of  public  debt  (GWDF)  and  the  change  in  domestic 
holdings  of  financial  assets  (i.e.  the  change  in  private  holdings  of 
public  debt  less  the  external  borrowing  of  the  nation,  PFIN)  are 
practically the  same  and  with a  similar T-value.  These  findings,  thus, 
suggest  that  the  countries  included  in this  sample  have  not  been  in  a 
position  to  significantly  influence  the  domestic  level  of  the  real 
rate of interest by  borrowing  or  lending abroad. 
The  high  and  statistically  significant  correlation  between  the  real 
rate  of  interest  and  the  change  in  private  holdings  of  public  debt 
(GWDF)  observed in this cross-section analysis contrasts sharly with a 
complete  absence  of  correlation between  the  real  rate of  interest  and 
the  unadjusted  government  budget  balance.  In  fact,  as  seen  from 
Table  10,  a  regression  of  the  real  rate  of  interest  on  the  data  for 
general  government  net  lending  yields  a  low  and  statistically 
insignificant  coefficient  of  the  latter  and  a  zero  value  of  the 
R-square.  The  adjustments  of  the  budget  balance,  which  proved  of 
little  econometrica!  significance  in  the  time-series  analysis,  thus 
prove  to  be highly justified in this cross-section analysis. 
1  The  adjusted  UK  position is indicated in Graph  7. -46-
Table  10 
Cross-section analysis  of  the  correlation  between  the  real  rate  of  interest and 
the  budget  balance 
Depend.variable  Canst.  Indep.  variable  R-sq 
RLAN  2,190 +  0,776  PFIN  0,328 
(unadjusted)  (4,306)  (2,798) 
RLAN  1,186 +  1,087  PFIN  0,554 
(adjusted)(!)  (4,128)  (4,457) 
RLAN  2,261  +  0,805  GWDF  0,297 
(unadjusted)  ( 4 ' 3  6  7 )  ( 2 ' 59 9·) 
RLAN  1,940 +  1,159  GWDF  0,528 
(adjusted)  (4,242)  (4,234) 
RLAN  =  2,562 +  0,063  NADF 
(unadjusted)  ( 3 ' 1  04 )  ( 0 ' 31 7 )  0,006 
RLAN  2,129 +  0,003  NADF 
(adjusted)  (2,383)  (0,013)  0,000 
RLAN  =  3,486 +  0,775  GWDF  - 0,787  WPRO  0,424 
(unadjusted)  (4,205)  (2,671)  (-1,820) 
RLAN  =  3,194 +  1,127  GWDF  - 0,805  WPRO  0,643 
(adjusted)  (4,534)  (4,576)  (-2,192) 
NOTE: 
RLAN  =  real rate of  interest 
RLAN  adjusted  =  real  rate  of  interest  with  adjusted  value  for  the  United 
Kingdom,  1961-70. 
NADF  =general government  net  lending  or  borrowing  (unadjusted). 
GWDF  =  change  in private holdings  of  public debt. 
PFIN  =  change  in  domestic  private  holdings  of  financial  assets  (GWDF  less  the 
net  lending of  the nation). 
WPRO  =%  change  in the real wage  gap  (real wage  less  factor  productivity). 6 
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GRAPH  7 
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Another  feature  of  a  particular  interest  is  shown  in  Table  10:  the 
introduction  of  the  the  real  wage  gap  in  the  equation  for  the  real 
rate  of  interest  in  this  cross-section  analysis  yields  both  a 
statistically significant coefficient  and  a  substantial  improvement  of 
the fit.  The  coefficient is negative,  implying  than an  increase in the 
real  wage  gap  has  exerted  a  negative  impact  on  the  real  rate  of 
interest.  This,  in  fact,  is  a  result  in  consistency  with  the 
conceptual  model:  an  increase  in  the  real  wage  gap,  other  things 
equal,  will  lead  to  a  decline  in  the  real  rate  of  return  on  fixed 
assets  and  thus  increase  the  "attractiveness"  of  financial  assets 
leading  to  a  lower  real  rate  of  interest  than  would  otherwise  be  the 
case.  It should  be  stressed that  this scenario by  and  large represents 
an  image  of  a  declining  economy,  with  a  fall  in  the  rate of  return on 
investment  leading  to  a  slowdown  of  the  rate  of  growth  and 
unemployment,  much  as  seen in practice in Europe  in the last  15  years. 
The  cross-section  examination,  thus,  provides  additional  strong 
confirmation of  the basic postulates of  the portfolio model  and  of  the 
"crowding  out  hypothesis":  although  the  last  regression  equation  in 
Table  10: 
RLANadj  = 3,194 +  1,127GWDF  - 0,805WPRO 
cannot  pretend  to  explain  fully  the  cross-country  differences  with 
respect  to  the  real  rate  of  interest  it  clearly  goes  a  long  way 
towards  establishing  a  consistent  model  in  this  field  for  the  OECD 
area  as  a  whole.  It also  suggests  that  a  major  part  of  the  5  points 
rise  in real  rates  of  interest  since  the  mid-1970s  can  be  attributed 
to  the  very  substantial  shift  in  the  annual  change  in  the  private 
holdings  of  public  debt,  from  an  annual  decline  of  close  to  2  GDP 
points  in  the  early  1970s  to  an  annual  rise  of  about  1  point  in  the 
1980s.  The  results  of  the  cross-section  analysis  also  strongly 
underline  the need  to adjust  the  budget  balance  for  the effects on  the 
debt/GDP  ratio  of  growth  in  nominal  GDP  and  for  the  degree  of  base 
money  financing  of  the  government  borrowing  requirement  (although  the 
former  adjustment if by  far  the most  important). -49-
5.7 Cross-section evidence of fiscal  crowding out 
While  the  time  series  analysis  and  the  examination  of  cross-section 
data  tend  to  confirm  the  thesis  that  the  rise  in real fiscal deficits 
since  the  mid-1970s  is  the  main  factor  behind  the  increase  in  real 
interest  rates,  the  analysis  leaves  open  the  question  whether  these 
fiscal deficits and  the resulting increase  in real interest rates  have 
actually "crowded  out"  private demand  in favour  of  public  demand.  This 
question may  best  be  answered  by  a  model  simulation  taking  account  of 
both  demand  and  supply  aspects  and  of  the  stock-flow  relations 
outlined  and  analysed  above.  However,  it is  outside  the  scope  of  the 
present  study  to  construct  and  run  a  full-scale  macro-economic  model 
for  the  OECD-area  as  a  whole  and  it  is,  therefore,  not  possible 
-within  this  framework  - to  present  more  than  provisional  conclusions 
based  on a  review of  the available cross-section evidence. 
In  fact,  as  shown  in  Table  11,  on  the  basis  of  the  data  for  the  six 
major  OECD-countries  with  a  breakdown  on  the ·three  sub-periods  used 
above  (1961-70,  1971-80  and  1981-84/85)  there  would  seem  to  be  some 
evidence  of crowding out,  or at least no  evidence  that  the  increase in 
budget  deficits  since  the  mid-1970s  has  helped  to  support  economic 
growth: 
- there  is  no  strong  evidence  of  an  impact  of  the  real  rate  of 
interest  on  the  rate  of  investment  in  the  economy  as  a  whole.  The 
rate  of  return  on  fixed  capital  is  highly  correlated  with  gross 
fixed  investment  as  a  percent  of  GDP  but  the  coefficient of  the  real 
interest rate is small  and  statistically insignificant; 
- there  is  evidence  that  the  real  rate  of  interest  exerts  a  certain 
negative  influence  upon  the  rate  of  growth  of  output  and  the 
coefficient  is  somewhat  more  significant  than  in  the  equation  for 
the  rate  of  investment.  However,  also  in  this  equation  the  rate  of 
return on  investment  is a  much  more  powerful  factor; -50-
- an  equation  (equation  2b  in Table  11)  regressing  the  rate  of  growth 
of  output  on  the  rate  of  return  on  investment  and  the  change  in 
private  holdings  of  public  debt  yields  a  relatively  high  and 
statistically  significant  (negative)  coefficient  of  the  latter 
independent  variable:  with  an  R-square  of  0,815  the  equation, 
indeed,  gives  a  surprisingly  good  "explanation"  of  the  rate  of 
growth of output. 
However,  although  these  findings  appear  consistent  with  the 
crowding  out  hypothesis,  the  equation  in  question  clearly  hides  a 
complicated  interaction  between  a  large  number  of  macro-economic 
variables  and,  therefore,  cannot  be  interpreted as  an expression of  a 
causal  relationship.  All  that  can  be  concluded  on  the  basis  of  these 
findings  is  that,  apparently,  the  six  countries  included  in  this 
sample  have  not  been  in  a  position  to  avoid  the  slowdown  of  economic 
growth  since  1973  through  the  expansionary  shift  of  fiscal  policy. 
Moreover,  it  would  seem  rather  unlikely  that,  by  allowing  fiscal 
deficits  to  rise  even  further  in  the  1980,  the  OECD  area  as  a  whole 
would  have  been able  to increase the rate of growth  (although it might 
have  been possible,  temporarily,  to  increase the level of activity). 
6.  A look ahead 
Since  several  of  the  statistical  series  used  in  this  study  are 
available  only  with  a  long  time  lag  it  has  not  been  possible  to 
include observations  for  1985  and  estimates  for  1986.  Nevertheless,  on 
the  basis  of  available  evidence  it  is  possible  to  make  some  brief 
conjectures about  the most  recent  developments. 
A striking feature  of  the  evolution of  the  OECD  economies  in the  last 
couple  of  years  has  been  the persistence of  a  large fiscal deficit for 
the  area  as  a  whole,  and  notably  when  adjusted  for  the  growth  of 
nominal  GDP  (since  the latter has  shown  a  certain slowdown  as  a  result 
of  the  slower  rate  of  inflation).  Despite  a  likely  small  increase  in 
base  money  in  proportion  to  GDP  the  private  holdings  of  public  debt -51-
Table  11 
Cross-section evidence of  fiscal  crowding out. 
1.  Rate  of  investment,  total economy 
GINV  14,51 + 0,884  RETU  + 0,082  RLAN 
(7,322)  (4,695)  (0,259) 
R-sq 
0,597 
2.  Rate  of  growth of output,  non-agricultural business 
a:  GVAO 
b:  GVAO 
GINV  = 
GVAO  = 
RETU  = 
RLAN  = 
GWDF 
NOTE: 
=  -0,509 +  0,575  RETU- 0,164  RLAN 
(-0,602)  (7,163)  (-1,213) 
-0,898 +  0,582  RETU  - 0,362  GWDF 
(-1,297)  (7,803)  (-1,951) 
R-sq 
0,789 
0,815 
gross  fixed  investment,  total economy,  % of  GDP  at constant  prices 
% change  in gross value  added,  volume  terms. 
net rate of  return on  gross capital stock,  non-agricultural business. 
real rate of interest 
change  in private holdings  of  public  debt  % of  GDP. 
Data  cover  the  six  major  OECD  countries  and  three  sub-period:  1961-70, 
1971-80,  1981-84. -52-
have,  therefore,  as  far as  can  be  seen,  also  in  1985  and  1986  risen by 
more  than  1  GDP  point  per  year  in line with  developments  from  1979  to 
1984.  This  persistence  of  a  large  additional  annual  claim  on  private 
financial  resources  may  be  assumed  to  be  the  main  factor  behind  the 
apparent  stickiness of real rates  of  interest in the  OECD  area. 
As  far  as  the  real  wage  gap  is  concerned  the  levelling-off  observed 
already in  1983  and  1984  seems  to  have  prevailed in  1985  and  1986:  for 
the  area  as  a  whole  the  real  product  wage  (nominal  wage  per  capita, 
deflated  by  the  GDP  deflator)  does  not  seem  to  have,  on  average, 
increased  by  more  than  the  growth  of  factor  productivity.  In  response 
to  the  more  moderate  rise  in  real  wage  cost  the  rate  of  growth  of 
employment  has  accelerated  to  somewhere  above  1%.  Although  also  the 
rate  of  growth  of  investment  has  accelerated  in  recent  years,  there 
has  clearly been  a  slowdown  of  the  rise  in  the  capital/labour  ratio. 
Other  things  equal,  this  somewhat  more  favorable  employment/capital 
stock development,  and  the  resulting increase in the  rate of return on 
fixed  capital may  also  (by  going  some  way  towards  restoring  a  certain 
yield  gap  in  favor  of  fixed  capital)  have  contributed  marginally  to 
maintaining  a  relatively  high  level  of  real  interest  rates  on 
government  bonds  and  to  maintain  pressure  on  financial  markets 
worldwide. 
7.  Summary  and  conclusions 
Through  an  examination of  quantitative evidence  for  the  OECD  area as  a 
whole  as  well  as  cross-section data  for  the  six major  OECD  countries, 
this  paper  attempts  to  throw  light  on  some  key  questions  facing 
macro-economic  analysis  in the  present situation: 
- why  are interest rates  so  high? 
- why  did  unemployment  rise  to  the  present high level? -53-
- what  can  budgetary  and  monetary  policy  do  to  influence  the  level of 
activity? 
- how  can  international  policy  coordination  contribute  to  improving 
the  economic  performance  of  the  OECD  economies? 
Starting  from  a  conceptual  framework  based  on  a  three-asset model  with 
an  exogenously determined real wage  the  paper  examines  some  of  the key 
stock-flow  relationships  in  the  OECD  economy  in  order  to  test  the 
feasibility  of  some  of  the  key  postulates  in  this  approach,  and 
notably  the  following: 
an  increase  in  public  interest  bearing  debt  in  proportion  to  GDP 
will  lead  to an  increase in the  real rate of  interest; 
- an  increase  in  the  gap  between  the  real  wage  and  total  factor 
product!  vi  ty  will  lead  to  (be  accompanied  by)  an  increase  in  the 
stock  of  fixed  capital  in  proportion  to  GDP  and  in  proportion  to 
labour  input. 
These  basic postulates are  examined first with  the help  of  time  series 
analysis  of  aggregate  data  for  the  OECD  area  as  a  whole  and  second 
with  the  help  of  a  cross-section  analysis  of  data  for  the  six  major 
OECD  countries:  Germany,- France,  Italy,  the  United  Kingdom,  the  United 
States and  Japan. 
The  quantitative  evidence  suggests  that  the  actual  performance  of  the 
OECD  economy  over  the  last  25  years  is  compatible  with  the  framework 
outlined above.  More  precisely,  the  following  conclusions are  drawn: -54-
- changes  over  the  medium  and  long  term  in  the  capital/labour  ratio 
have  been  associated  with  an  increase  in  the  real  wage  gap.  The 
cross-section analysis  shows  that  the  countries which  have  shown  the 
lowest  increase in  the  wage  gap  are  also  those  which  have  shown  the 
smallest  increase  in the capital/labour ratio. 
- time  series analysis  shows  a  strong medium  and  long  term correlation 
between  the  private  holdings  of  public  debt  and  the  real  rate  of 
interest.  Moreover,  due  to  interaction between  these  two  variables, 
the  government  budget  deficit  as  adjusted  for  the  effect  of  growth 
of  nominal  GOP  on  the ratio between  public debt  and  GOP  and  for  base 
money  financing  exerts  a  strong  impact  on  the  real  rate  of 
interest.  The  cross-section  examination  based  on  data  for  the  six 
major  OECO  countries  for  three  sub  periods  provides  additional 
confirmation  of  this  postulate.  However,  the  cross-section  data 
show  this  correlation  only  for  the  growth-adjusted  budget  balance 
but  not  for  the_unadjusted  one,  suggesting  that  the  former  is  the 
appropriate definition for  analyzing  crowding-out  phenomena; 
- there  are  indications,  cased  on  the  cross-section  data,  that  the 
real  wage  gap  may  exert  a  certain  influence  on  the  real  rate  of 
interest,  a  low  real  wage  gap  being  associated  with  a  relatively 
high  real  rate  of  interest  and  vice  versa,  an  observation which  is 
in line with the conceptual  framework; 
- the  cross-section analysis,  nevertheless,  shows  that  the  position of 
individual  countries  may  diverge  substantially  from  the  situation 
observed  for  the  OECD  area  as  a  whole,  as  regards  both  the 
development  of  the capital/labour ratio in relation to  the  real wage 
gap  and  the  real  rate  of  interest  in  relation  to  the  change  in 
private  holdings  of  public  debt.  Thus,  for  policy  makers  of  an 
individual  OECD  country it may  well,  during  the  past  25  years,  have 
appeared  possible  for  example  to  neutralize  the  effect  of  a  rise in 
the  real wage  per  hour  through competitive devaluations  or  to  escape 
the  effect  on  the  real  rate  of  interest  from  a  budget  deficit -55-
through  external  borrowing.  For  the  OECD  area  as  a  whole,  however, 
such  "escape  routes"  have  not  been  feasible  and  the  impact  of 
changes  in the  key  parameters  is,  therefore,  seen much  more  clearly 
in the  OECD  aggregates  than in the data for  individual countries. 
The  results  of  the  present  study,  indeed,  tend  to  emphasize  the 
dangers  for  the  OECD  economy  and  for  the  rest  of  the  world  (notably 
the  highly  indebted  LDCs)  inherent  in  a  continuation  of  the  rise  in 
the  private holdings  of  public  debt  seen during  the last 5-6  years  for 
the  OECD  area as  a  whole.  Although  public  debt  in proportion  to  GOP  is 
still  relatively  small,  compared  to,  notably,  the  total  amount  of 
money  and  quasi-money  or  the  total  of  fixed  capital  owned  by  the 
private  sector,  the  annual  increase  of  more  than  1  GDP  point  in  the 
private  holdings  of  public  debt  is  large  in  proportion  to  the 
financial  saving  of  the  private  sector  and,  on  the  margin,  is  likely 
to exert  a  significant strain on  financial markets. 
More  generally the  results  of  the  study  shed  some  light  on  aspects  of 
the  international  policy  coordination  which,  hitherto,  have  been  left 
somewhat  in  the  shadow.  In  fact,  and  notably  in  the  context  of  the 
"concerted  action"  of  1978  {the  concerted  fiscal  reflation undertaken 
after  Bonn  summit,  and  which  was  reflected  in  both  a  rise  in  the 
cyclically  adjusted  budget  deficit  of  the  OECD  countries  as  a  whole 
and  a  significant  rise  in  the  base  money/GDP  ratio)  the  tendency  has 
normally  been  to  underline  the  gains  from  a  undertaking  __  a  fiscal 
reflation  in  a  framework  of  international  coordination.  In  fact,  if 
fiscal  reflation  is  undertaken  by  a  large  group  of  inter-related 
countries,  the  balance  of  payments  constraints  on  such  action will  be 
much  smaller  than in case  a  fiscal reflation is undertaken  by  a  single 
country.  The  present  study,  however,  shows  that  a  concerted  increase 
in the  fiscal deficit  for,  say,  the  OECD  area  as  a  whole,  as  actually 
observed  after  1978,  may  lead  to  a  progressive  rise  in  the  real  rate 
of  interest  which,  in  the  medium  term,  will  not  only  nullify  the -56-
beneficial  effects  of  the  fiscal  reflation  but  actually  lead  to  a 
lower  level  of  activity  and  employment  than  would  have  been  achieved 
without  this  fiscal  reflation.  Unfortunately  the  negative  effects  are 
not  felt in the short  term  and  are  in  any  case  only  felt  in  a  diffuse 
and  indirect  way  by  the  single  country  - even  if  it  is  a  dominant 
economy  in the  OECD  context. 
Another  issue  raised  by  this  study  is  related  to  the  possibility for 
the  individual  country  to  improve  its  long-term  position  by 
implementing  a  fiscal  consolidation  in  isolation1.  Since,  as  shown 
above,  the  relation  between  the  real  rate  of  interest  and  the  budget 
deficit on  the  level of  the  single country is uncertain,  influenced as 
it  may  be  by  fiscal  policy  in  other  countries  and  by  capital 
movements,  the  perceived  gains  from  fiscal  consolidation  "in  a  single 
country"  may  be  too  small  to  be  worth  the  political  investment 
required.  As  suggested  in  a  recent  study  of  the  problems  of 
international  policy  coordination2  it  would,  therefore,  be  highly 
desirable  that  aggregate  budgetary  and  monetary  targets  be  fixed  in 
such  a  way  as  to  be  consistent  with  a  sustainable  path  of  private 
financial  saving  and,  hence,  private  holdings  of  public  debt  for  the 
OECD  area as  a  whole. 
As  far as  the  present situation is concerned,  the  results of  the  study 
do  suggest  that  a  sustainable  reduction  of  the  real  rate  of  interest 
in  the  OECD  area  will  require  a  significant  reduction  of  the 
growth-adjusted  budget  deficit  for  the  area  as  a  whole.  On  the  other 
hand,  although  there  are  some  indications  of  a  long-term  crowding-out 
of  private activity as  a  result of  persistent government  deficits,  the 
study  also  underlines  that  the  real  rate  of  interest  on  government 
debt  seems  to exert a  relatively weak  influence on  economic  growth.  In 
1  For  a  further  discussion of  this  point  see  also Tullio  (1986)  which 
presents  findings  and  conclusions  largely  consistent  with  those 
presented above. 
2  See  Steinherr  (1984)  in European  Economy  N°20,  July 1984. -57-
contrast,  the  cross-section  analysis  suggests  that  the  real  wage  gap 
and  the  rate  of  return  on  fixed  capital  interact  strongly  with  the 
rate  of  growth  of  output  and  that  a  strengthening  of  the  latter and, 
consequently  of  the  growth  of  employment,  will  require  not  only  a 
lowering  of  the  real  rate  of  interest  but  also,  and  much  more 
significantly,  a  substantial  improvement  of  the  rate  of  return  on 
investment. -58-
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TECHNICAL  ANNEX 
A.  Statistical data:  sources  and  methodology 
A.l  Gross  domestic  product  and  GDP  deflator 
Data  on  GDP  and  the  GDP  deflator have  been extracted  from  the  EUROSTAT 
data  bank  (CRONOS).  Series  covering  the  EC  Member  States correspond  to 
the  standardized  national  accounts  system  (SEC)  while  for  the  non-EC 
countries compatibility is not  fully guaranteed. 
Except  where  otherwise  indicated  the  aggregates  for  the  OECD  area as  a 
whole  have  been  calculated  as  weighted  geometrical  means  of  the 
country  data.  The  weights  correspond  to  the  country's  share  of  the 
OECD  area's  gross  domestic  product,  converted  at  current  purchasing 
power  parity,  following  the  methodology  of  the  EUROSTAT-statistics. 
Purchasing  power  parities  for  the  years  subsequent  to  1980  - the  last 
year  for  which  a  relative  price  survey  was  available  - have  been 
approximated  by  extrapolation  using  the  relative  changes  in  the 
GDP-deflator.  For  further  details  on  the  purchasing  power  parity 
approach  the  reader  is referred to  EUROSTAT  publications. 
The  use  of  current  purchasing  power  parity  weighting  is  clearly 
preferable  to  a  weighting  scheme  based  on  current  exchange  rates, 
since  the  latter  entails  major  short  term  changes  in  the  relative 
weight  of,  notably,  the  United  States.  At  the  same  time  the  current 
purchasing  parity  based  weight  ensure  that  the  weight  of,  notably, 
Japan  in  the  OECD  average  is  gradually  raised  in  the  course  of  the 
period  in  line  with  the  relative  expansion  of  the  output  of  the 
Japanese  economy. 
The  geometrical  weighting  scheme,  which  in  practice  is  equivalent  to 
calculating  the  area average  on  the  basis  of  the  percentage  changes  in 
the  country  data  is  necessary  to  ensure  "reversability"  of  the 
calculation.  In  fact,  an  arithmetically weighted  Laspeyre  index  leads 
to  a  gradual  increase  in  the  weight  of  the  series with  rising values 
over  time  - a  feature  which  may  not  always  be  appropriate,  and  which, 
in  any  case,  entails  a  distortion  in  case  the  aggregate  (average)  is 
calculated  with  moving  weights.  The  chosen  weighting  scheme  has  the 
advantage  of  being  applicable  both  for  current  price  and  for  volume 
series alike. 
A.2  Interest rate data 
Interest rate data were  extracted  from  the data  bank of  the  Commission 
services  and  originate  from  national  sources.  Typically  the  series  on 
long  term  interest  rates  cover  yields  on  government  bonds  and/or 
semi-public  institutions  and  public  enterprises  while  the  short  term 
interest data in most  cases  cover  yields  on  3-month  interbank deposits 
or,  in  a  few  cases,  on  3-month  treasury  bills.  Area  aggregates  were 
calculated  as  the  weighted  geometrical  mean  of  the  country  data.  In -61-
the  case  of  Japan  data  were  lacking  for  most  of  the  1960  and  rates 
were  simply extrapolated backwards  from  the  known  level. 
A.3  Base money  and money  supply data 
Data  on  base  money  developments  were  extracted  directly  from  the  IMF 
International  Financial  Statistics.  The  series  include  money  in 
circulation  outside  the  banks  and  commercial  bank  reserves  with  the 
central bank  (item  14  in IFS  statistical tables). 
The  money  supply  series  used  in  the  paper  correspond  to  the  broad 
definition  of  money  supply,  the  M2/3  definition,  which  includes 
circulating notes  and  coins,  current  bank  deposits  and  various  assets 
with  banks  and  other  financial  institutions  in  the  form  of  deposit 
accounts,  savings  accounts  or  short-term  notes.  Details  on  the 
definitions  of  series  for  EC  Member  States  can  be  found  in  the 
technical annex  to European Economy  No.  26,  1985. 
A.4  Data  on factor  inputs,  factor cost and  productivity 
The  data  on  capital/output  ratio,  capital/labour  ratio,  labour  cost 
and  productivity  presented  above  cover  only  Germany,  France,  Italy, 
the  United  Kingdom,  the  United  States  and  Japan.  They  are  extracted 
from  a  data bank created by  the  Commission  services  in  1985-86  for  the 
purpose  of  analyzing  profitability and  productivity  developments  more 
thoroughly  than  had  been  the  case  in  the  past.  The  series  cover 
non-agricultural  business,  excluding  housing  (data  for  the 
manufacturing  sector  are  available  in  the  data  bank).  Details  on  the 
definitions  and  on  certain estimation procedures  have  been  provided  in 
an  internal  paper  (DGII  05077  of  6.  June  1986)  and  are therefore  not 
reproduced here. 
The  capital  stock  series  used  in  this  study  have  been  adjusted  for 
fluctuations  in  capacity  utilization  following  the  methodology 
outlined  in  the  article  on  "Productive  supply  in  the  Community"  -
European  Economy  No.  29,  July  1986.  The  rate  of  capacity  utilization 
used  is  that  indicated  in  the  Community  business  surveys  with earlier 
data  coming  from  national  sources  or  being  based  on  deviations  from 
trend rates of  growth  in the early 1960s.  The  data  for  employment  take 
account  of  an  adjustment  for  change  in  working  hours  per  week.  In 
fact,  since  the  weekly  working  time  has  fallen  considerably  faster  in 
Europe  than in Japan  and  the  United  States,  the  series on  hours  worked 
provide  a  more  appropriate  indication of  the  relative  developments  of 
labour  input  than series on  the  number  of  persons  employed. 
The  figures  on  factor  productivity  have  been  calculated  using  the 
methodology  described  in  the  article referred  to  above  and  in Douglas 
Todd:  "Factor  productivity  growth  in  four  EEC  Countries"  (EC  Economic 
Paper  No.  34,  October  1984).  The  broad  aim  of  this  calculation  is  to 
separate  the  growth  in labour productivity in  two  parts: -62-
- a  part  attributable  to  a  "genuine"  growth  in  output  per  unit  of 
factor  input  taking account  not  only of  the  input of  labour but also 
of  the  input of capital; 
- a  part attributable  to an  increase in the  amount  of capital used  per 
unit of  labour  input. 
The  first-mentioned  part  of  productivity  increases  is  termed  "factor 
productivity"  since,  as  indicated,  it is  based  on  total  factor  input, 
while  the  second  part  is  termed  "productivity effect  of  the  change  in 
factor mix"  or  "effect of  factor  substitution". 
The  calculation of  factor productivity growth is done  as  follows: 
TFP  = LP  - aCI 
where  'TFP'  is the  percentage  change  in factor  productivity,  'LP',  the 
percentage  change  in  output  per  unit  of  labour  input  (in  this  case, 
the  number  of  hours  worked),  'a'  is  the  share  of  profits  in national 
income  and  'CI'  is  the  perce-ntage  change  in  the  amount  of  capital  per 
unit of  labour  input  (capital intensity). 
The  factor  productivity  growth  defined  as  indicated  above  has  been 
used  to  calculate  the  'real  wage  gap'  which,  in  this  study,  is 
identified  as  a  key  "driving  force"  in  the  economic  system,  alongside 
the  changes  in  the  portfolio  structure.  The  real  wage  gap  is 
calculated  as  the  real  wage  per  unit  of  labour  input  divided  by  the 
index  of  factor  productivity.  The  real  wage  per  unit  of  labour  input 
is  calculated  as  a  cost  concept,  using  the  value  added  deflator  and 
for  the  purpose of  this  study based  on  hours  worked. 
In calculating  the  real  wage  gap  on  the  basis  of  factor  productivity 
growth rather  than  on  the basis  of  labour  productivity growth,  account 
is  taken  of  the  possibility  that  the  apparent  labour  productivity 
growth  may  be  brought  about  in  part  through  elimination  of 
unproductive  jobs  and/or  an  increase  in  the  capital  intensity  of 
production.  In  fact,  as  have  been  observed  in practice  in Europe  over 
a  long  period,  the  actually observed  increases  in  labour  productivity 
tend  to  "cover"  the  real  wage  increases  ex  post,  but  do  not  give  any 
indication as  to  the  "ex ante''  tension which  may  have  existed  between 
the  underlying  productivity  increase  and  the  rise  in  real  wage  costs 
per  hour  as  perceived by  the  firms.  The  calculated factor productivity 
growth,  on  the  other  hand,  can  be  assumed  to  correspond  (or  to 
approximate)  the  underlying  rate  of  "technical  progress"  in  the 
economy  and  the difference  between  the rise in real wage  cost  per hour 
and  the  rise  in  factor  productivity  is,  therefore,  the  most  unbiased 
indicator  for  the  part  of  real  wage  increases  which  are  not  ex  ante 
covered  by  productivity  increases.  A  rise  in  the  real  wage  gap  will, 
therefore,  be  reflected  either  in  a  decline  in  profits  in  proportion 
to  national  income  or  in  a  rise  in  the  capital/labour  ratio.  The 
latter may  reflect either  a  fall  in  employment  or  a  rise in the stock 
of capital but will in practice  be  a  combination of both. -63-
A.5  Public debt data and  the  public debt/GDP  ratio 
The  public  debt  concept  aimed  at  in  this  study  is  the  net  financial 
position  of  the  general  government,  calculated  as  gross  liabilities 
less  the  financial  assets  of  general  government.  As  underlined  in 
Cukierman  and  Mortensen  (1983  and  1985)  there  are  strong  conceptual 
reasons  for  considering  the  central  bank  as  a  part  of  general 
government  and  to  consolidate  the  two  accounts,  both  as  far  as  stock 
and  flow  statistics  are  concerned.  In  practice  national  accounts 
statistics  most  often  consider  the  central  bank  as  a  part  of  the 
financial  sector,  implying  that  the  transactions  between  the  general 
government  and  the  central  bank  are  included  in  the  data  on 
transactions  between  general  government  and  the  rest  of  the  economy. 
More  specifically this  procedure  implies  that  the  part  of  public  debt 
which is held  by  the  central  bank  as  a  collateral  against  liabilities 
to  the  banks  or  the  general  public  is  considered  in  accounting  terms 
as  government  liabilities alongside  debt  held  directly  by  the  private 
sector. 
This  is  by  no  means  the  only statistical problem  arising with respect 
to  the  interpretation  of  data  on  public  debt.  In  fact,  since  the 
standardised  system  of  national  accounts  adopted  by  the  international 
organisations  in  the  post-war  period  focussed  exclusively  on  the  flow 
statistics,  no  clear  guidelines  have  until  recently  been  worked  out 
for  balance  sheet  data  and  the official,  national series on  government 
assets  and  liabilities,  consequently,  are  highly  heterogeneous  with 
respect  both  to  the  items  covered  and  to  the  sectoral  classification. 
Thus,  in  some  cases  the  available  data  cover  only  central  government 
but  not  local  government  and  social  security  while,  in  others,  the 
data cover  only gross  liabilities but  not  financial assets.  An  attempt 
to  produce  internationally  comparable  series  was  done  in  the  context 
of  the  study of  "monetary  assets  and  inflation-induced distortions  af 
national  accounts"  undertaken  by  the  Commission  services  in  1983/1984 
and  published  in volume  I  of  Studies  in  Banking  and  Finance.  However, 
these  data  are  not  available  on  a  permanent  basis  and  it  has  been 
considered  outside  the  scope  of  the  present  study  (and  indeed  beyond 
the possibilities of  a  single  person within the  time available  for  the 
study)  to  extend  these  adjustments  both  in  time  and  in space  (to cover 
the  non-EC  countries). 
As  a  second  best  approach,  it  has  generally  been  assumed  that  the 
available statistical series  in most  cases  come  close  to  representing 
the  total  net  monetary  liabilities  of  general  government,  including 
the  debt  to  the  central  bank.  In  terms  of  the  conceptual  framework 
presented  in  the  study  above,  is  has,  thus,  been  assumed  that  the 
official  data  on  public  debt  found  in  national  statistical 
publications constitute an  approximation of  total monetary liabilities 
of  the  extended  government  sector,  including  the  central  bank. 
Consequently  the  amount  of  government  debt  which  is  held  outside  the 
central bank  can  be  approximated  by  deducting  the  amount  of  base money 
from  the  total  of  monetary  liabilities.  As  shown  in  the  analysis  of 
regression  results  in  the  main  text,  there  are  strong  indications 
that,  at  least  for  the  OECD  area  as  a  whole,  this approach  provides  a 
"reasonable"  approximation  of  the  true  figure  for  interest  bearing -64-
debt  in  the  hands  of  the  general  public  of  the  banking  system  (as  a 
collateral for  deposits). 
As  far  as  sources  of  the  statistical  data  are  concerned,  the  series 
for  the  EC-member  states  have  been  extracted  from  national 
publications while  the  series  for  the  three  non-EC  member  states  have 
been  extracted  from  the  IMF  International  Financial  Statistics  {line 
88  in  the  IFS  Yearbook).  Certain  debt  data  for  the  early  1960s  have 
been  estimated  by  the  author  on  the  basis  of  existing  debt  statistics 
combined  with  the  budget  balance  data  and  using  the  stock/flow 
consistency relation defined  in the main  body  of  this  study. 
A.6  Adjustment  of  bud  et balance data for  c  clical fluctuations 
In various  attempts  made  in  the  1  60s  with  the  purpose  of  determining 
whether  the  stance  fiscal  policy  was  "adequate"  with  a  view  to  the 
full  employment  objective  it was  quite  common  to  calculate  the  "full 
employment  budget  balance"  as  a  measure  of  the  level  at  which  the 
budget  balance  could  be  supposed  to  settle  under  conditions  of  full 
employment  in  the  economy.  This  approach,  which  is  still followed  in 
some  institutions,  involved  recalculating a  theoretical budget  balance 
"as  if"  all  elements  of  the  economic  system  were  requalibrated  to  a 
level of  full  employment. 
The  calculation  of  a  "full  employment  budget  surplus",  if  valid  at 
all,  will  provide  biassed  results  if  a  part  of  the  unemployment  is 
"classical",  that  is,  due  to  a  real wage  gap,  rather  than  "keynesian", 
that  is,  attributable  to  fluctuations  of  activity around  a  medium- or 
long-term  trend.  As  indicated  above,  there  are  rather  strong 
indications  that  the  rise  in  unemployment  in  the  OECD  area  in  the 
1970s  and  the  1980s  may  to  a  considerable  extent  be  due  to  the  steady 
rise in the  "real wage  gap"  {the real wage  per unit  of  labour  input  as 
divided  by  an  index  for  factor  productivity)  and,  thus,  be  largely of 
a  classical nature. 
Given  that,  under  those  conditions,  any  measure  of  the  "adequacy"  of 
fiscal  policy  would  create  a  false  picture  of  the  real  underlying 
trend  movement  of  public  debt  in  proportion  to  GDP  the  present  study 
has  aimed  at  eliminating  only  the  estimated  effects  on  the  budget 
balance  of  fluctuations  of  activity  (GDP)  around  its  calculated 
medium-term  trend.  Since,  moreover,  the  trend  has  changed  in  the 
course  of  the  1961-1984  period,  the  adjustment  has  been  made  with  the 
help  of  a  "spline  regression"  - calculating  the  trend  with  a  break  in 
1973.  In  the  present  study  only  the  aggregate  budget  balance  for  the 
OECD  area as  a  whole  has  been adjusted  for  cyclical variations  but  not 
the  figures  used  in  the  cross-section  analysis.  The  adjustment  has 
been made  simply  by eliminating  from  the  budget  balance  the effects of 
the  deviation  of  GDP  from  its  trend,  estimated  by  ordinary  least 
squares.  The  result  of  this  regression  of  the  budget  balance  on  the 
deviation of  GDP  from  its trend,  however,  gives  a  result which is well 
in  line  with  more  detailed  estimates  of  the  effect  of  cyclical 
fluctuations  on  the  budgetary  aggregates:  a  deviation  of  GDP  of  1% 
from  its  trend  tend  to  lead  to  a  deviation  of  the  budget  balance  of 
about  0,6%  GDP  points  from  its cyclically neutral level. -65-
B.  Bilateral correlation coefficients 
WPRO  RLAN  PGDP  LINT  SINT 
WPRO 
RLAN  0,27 
PGDP  0,69  -0,39 
LING  0,94  0,41  0,65 
SINT  0,86  0,34  0,67  0,96 
NADF  -0,78  -0,49  -0,38  -0,77  -0,59 
GADF  -0,72  ~o,44  -0,39  -0,72  -0,54 
GWDF  0,84  0,43  0,47  0,85  0,76 
GOND  -0,00  0,81  -0,56  0,07  -0,01 
PROG  0,15  0,86  -0,45  0,23  0,14 
CAPY  0,89  0,57  0,44  0,89  0,75 
CALO  0,99  0,35  0,61  0,93  0,87 
BMNP  -0,91  -0,58  -0,44  -0,94  -0,86 
BMNT  0,08  -0,78  0,47  0,17  0,16 
SMNP  0,96  0,37  0,55  0,87  0,77 
SMNT  0,09  0,15  0,13  0,26  0,34 -66-
c.  Stability tests 
The  following  graphs  present  the  value  of  constants  and  coefficients  as 
estimated  by  two  series of  regre-ssions  testing respectively the  forward  and 
the  backward  stability of  the coefficients. 
The  upper  part  of  the  graph  indicates  for  the  equation  in  question  the 
outcome  of  regressions  starting  with  the  1962-1973  period  and  ending  with 
the  1962-1984  period.  The  horizontal  axis  of  the  graph,  thus,  indicates 
the  end  year of  the regression. 
The  lower  part  of  the  graph  indicates  for  the  same  equation the  outcome  of 
regressions  beginning  with  the  regression  over  the  whole  period  1962-1984 
and  ending  with  the  period  1973-1984.  The  horizontal  axis  of  the  graph, 
thus,  indicates  the starting year of  the regression. 
(The  regressions  and  the  graphs  have  been  executed  with  the  help  of  the 
TROLL-program  and  a  plotting  facility  of  the  data  room  of  the  Directorate 
General  for  Economic  and  Financial Affairs.) -67-
Stability test:  equation  3,  Table  7 
RLAN~C+A1*GWDF+A2*ALAN(-1) 
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Stability test:  equation  5,  Table  7 
RLAN•C+A1MPROG(-1)+A2MGWOF+A3MRLAN(-1) 
CONSTANT 
-.45 
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